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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S LICENSING LAW 
JURISPRUDENCE: ITS NATURE AND INFLUENCE 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz∗ 
Abstract: The Federal Circuit serves as the central appellate court for U.S. patent law 
appeals. Outside of patent law, scholars have noted the Federal Circuit’s distinct lack of 
influence on the law. Thus, unnoticed, the Federal Circuit has become one of the most 
influential actors in the creation of intellectual property licensing law. Its influence reaches 
across all areas of intellectual property, industries, and all federal circuits and state courts. 
But the Federal Circuit’s influence on licensing law is more than just a matter of academic 
interest: licensing is critical to innovation in the information economy. Licenses underlie the 
creation and distribution of ideas, information, inventions, and works. Products as diverse as 
open source software and soybean seed rely on licensing. 
The Federal Circuit’s influence emerged out of failed attempts to create uniform statutory 
licensing law, which has left licensing law to develop as common law. Since its creation in 
1982, the Federal Circuit has decided more cases involving licensing law than any other state 
or federal court. Many courts have looked to and followed the Federal Circuit’s decisions. 
The Federal Circuit’s general approach has been to uphold modern licensing models, which 
fosters both technological and business model innovation. This approach is consistent with 
the approach taken by most other courts, including the Supreme Court. At the urging of the 
U.S. Solicitor General and others, the Supreme Court probed the Federal Circuit’s licensing 
law jurisprudence in a recent case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. While the 
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in a unanimous decision, upon close inspection, 
the reversal actually amounts to an affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s core licensing-law 
jurisprudence. 
 
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF LICENSING AS A TRANSACTION 
MODEL AND ITS CRITICAL ROLE IN INNOVATION .......... 204 
A.  Technological Innovation: Licenses to Build Products ...... 205 
B.  Technological Innovation: Licenses to Create Customer  
 Solutions ............................................................................. 206 
C.  Business-Model Innovation: Licenses to Distribute  
 Products .............................................................................. 207 
D.  Business-Model Innovation: Licenses to Use Products ...... 207 
II.  EVOLUTION OF LICENSING LAW .......................................... 208 
                                                     
∗ Professor of Law; Director for Academics in Law, Technology & the Arts, University of 
Washington School of Law; Washington Law Foundation Scholar. Many thanks to Steve 
Calandrillo, Dan Laster, Janice Mueller, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Sean O’Connor, Toshiko Takenaka, 
Liza Vertinsky, Kathryn Watts, and Louis Wolcher for useful discussions and comments. I am very 
grateful to Nika Aldrich, David Ray, and the librarians of the Gallagher Law Library for invaluable 
research assistance. 
GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC 5/28/2009  10:46 AM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:199, 2009 
200 
A.  A Body of Law Takes Shape .............................................. 208 
B.  The UCC Article 2B and Uniform Computer Information  
 Transactions Act (UCITA) Experiment ............................. 210 
C.  The 2003 Amendments to UCC 2 ...................................... 211 
D. Retreat Back to the Common Law ..................................... 213 
III.  CREATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT........................................................................................ 214 
IV.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INFLUENCE IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LICENSING LAW .................................... 215 
A.  Defining “Influence” .......................................................... 215 
B.  Number of Licensing-Law Cases Decided ......................... 216 
C.  Citations to Federal Circuit Cases ...................................... 219 
D.  Final Observations on the Federal Circuit’s “Influence” in  
 Licensing Law .................................................................... 219 
V.  THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
JURISPRUDENCE ........................................................................ 220 
A.  First Sale Cases ................................................................... 221 
B.      Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s First Sale Jurisprudence:  
         Comparison to Supreme Court Precedent ........................... 225 
1.  From Mallinckrodt to Monsanto ...................................... 225 
2.  The Monsanto Cases ........................................................ 229 
3.  The Latest: Quanta Computer, Inc. v.  
 LG Electronics, Inc. ......................................................... 232 
i. The Federal Circuit’s Decision ...................................... 232 
   ii.  The Supreme Court’s Decision ...................................... 234 
C.  Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s First Sale Jurisprudence:  
 Comparison to Other United States Circuit Courts ............ 237 
1.  Patent Exhaustion ............................................................ 238 
2.  Copyright First Sale ......................................................... 239 
VI.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STEWARDSHIP OF 
LICENSING LAW ........................................................................ 242 
A.  Upholding the Use of Licenses in Technological and  
 Business-Model Innovation ................................................ 242 
B.  Future Licensing-Law Cases .............................................. 249 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 250 
APPENDIX I: COURTS CITING FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES ...... 251 
 
 
GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC 5/28/2009  10:46 AM 
Federal Circuit Licensing Law 
201 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 
to decide patent-law appeals.1 Congress hoped that the Federal Circuit 
would improve the climate for innovation2 by giving inventors a uniform 
body of judicial interpretations of patent law decided by judges with 
patent expertise.3 Recently, scholars have debated whether the net effect 
of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence has been positive or not.4 Adding 
fuel to that debate, lately the Supreme Court has decided an unusually 
large number of patent cases,5 reversing the Federal Circuit each time,6 
and causing some observers to speculate that the Supreme Court is 
unhappy with the Federal Circuit’s tendencies.7 
                                                     
1. The Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction extends to decisions by all District Courts in patent 
infringement suits, decisions by the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office, as well 
as decisions by the U.S. International Trade Commission and U.S. Claims Court. 28 U.S.C. § 
1295(a)(1) (2000). See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 
(2002); Paul M. Janicke, Two Unsettled Aspects of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Jurisdiction, VA. 
J.L. & TECH., Spring 2006, at 1, 2, available at http://www.vjolt.net/archives.php?issue=30, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n1.pdf. 
2. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 
64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1989); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 821, 821–23 (2005). 
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 12–17 (1981); see also 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 571–72 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en 
banc). 
4. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Patent Law, the Federal 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004); S. Jay 
Plager, The Price of Popularity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2007, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 751 (2007); William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal 
Circuit’s Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000); R. Polk Wagner 
& Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105 (2004). 
5. See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.06[3][e][i], at 11-651 n.262 (2005) (“In 
the past, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in only a small percentage of patent cases.”); see 
also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 97 (1993) (“As a matter of practice, the 
possibility that we would grant certiorari simply to review that [Federal Circuit’s] resolution of an 
infringement issue is extremely remote, but as a matter of law we could do so . . . .”); Plager, supra 
note 4, at 755 (noting that the Supreme Court has intervened when it appears that the Federal Circuit 
is “creating special rules that are unwarranted”). 
6. E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
7. E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and 
Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28 (2007), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/eisenberg.pdf, permanent copy 
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The cases decided by the Federal Circuit typically involve familiar 
patent law issues such as patent validity8 or the scope of patent claims.9 
Although other issues arise from time to time, the Federal Circuit’s role 
is unremarkable except in one significant area of modern law—licensing 
law.10 Unnoticed, even in the recent hot spotlight focused on the Federal 
Circuit, is the fact that the Federal Circuit has become one of the most 
influential forces in the creation of licensing law.11 On one level, this is 
not surprising; one would expect the court to handle cases involving 
patent licenses.12 However, the Federal Circuit’s influence now reaches 
beyond patent licensing, across all areas of intellectual property and 
industries, and across all federal circuits and state courts. 
The Federal Circuit’s influence emerged out of failed attempts to 
create uniform statutory licensing law. In the wake of these failed 
                                                     
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n7.pdf; Arthur J. Gajarsa & 
Lawrence P. Cogswell, The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821 (2006). 
According to Professor Eisenberg, the Supreme Court intervenes: when the Federal Circuit’s patent 
jurisprudence is at odds with treatment of similar issues in other fields of law; when the Federal 
Circuit has departed from the Supreme Court’s patent law precedent; to resolve internal disputes 
within the Federal Circuit; when the Supreme Court seeks Solicitor General’s view and the Solicitor 
General recommends that the Court take the case (this is important because there are no circuit 
splits to show possible tensions in the law); when amicus briefs urge acceptance. Eisenberg, supra 
at 29–30. 
8. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent 
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical 
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998).  
9. See generally Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Claim 
Construction Trends, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim 
Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 
(2005); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007). 
10. In this article I use the term “licensing law” to refer to the law that pertains to intellectual 
property, software, and information licensing. See generally JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999); ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING (1999); XUAN-THAO 
N. NGUYEN, ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, & DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, SOFTWARE, AND INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW AND PRACTICE 2–5 (2006); RAYMOND 
T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 1:2 (2005). 
11. Outside of patent law and the Federal Circuit’s potential influence on antitrust law, see 
Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making Antitrust Law for the Whole 
Country?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (2002), the Federal Circuit has been notable for its distinct lack 
of influence on other circuit courts. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 779. However, one student 
commentator has also noted the influence of the Federal Circuit’s decisions involving standard 
forms. See Christopher M. Kaiser, Comment, Take It or Leave It: Monsanto v. McFarling, Bowers 
v. Baystate, and the Federal Circuit’s Formalistic Approach to Contracts of Adhesion, 80 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 487 (2005). 
12. E.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). This case is 
discussed infra at Part V.A. 
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efforts, licensing law has developed as common law. Since its creation 
in 1982, the Federal Circuit has decided more cases involving licensing 
law than any other state or federal court. With licensing law evolving 
through the common law, other courts have looked to the Federal 
Circuit’s case law for guidance in deciding licensing-related cases. More 
will undoubtedly do so in the future. 
The Federal Circuit’s licensing-law jurisprudence is more than just a 
matter of academic interest. Licensing is a critical transaction model in 
the information economy because it enables innovation.13 Products as 
diverse as open source software and soybean seed rely on licensing. 
Consequently, the nature of the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law 
jurisprudence, like its patent-law jurisprudence,14 strongly influences the 
climate for innovation in the United States—for good or for ill. The 
Supreme Court undoubtedly understands this, as it recently reviewed a 
Federal Circuit case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,15 
which lies at the heart of the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law 
jurisprudence. 
This Article begins by describing in Part I the emergence of licensing 
as the dominant transaction model in the information economy. It then 
explores in Part II the development of licensing law in the United States 
and how, in the wake of failed attempts to create uniform statutory 
licensing law, the law has evolved largely as common law. This Article 
then explains in Part III and Part IV how the Federal Circuit has begun 
to shape this common law by deciding more and more cases involving 
licenses, and how other courts now look to the Federal Circuit for 
guidance in deciding licensing-related cases. In Part V, this Article 
explores the nature of the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law jurisprudence, 
focusing on its “first sale” jurisprudence. This Part also examines how 
the Federal Circuit’s case law meshes with the decisions of other circuits 
and the Supreme Court, including the Supreme Court’s recent Quanta 
Computer decision. 
This Article concludes in Part VI that the Federal Circuit has been a 
good but sometimes imperfect steward of modern licensing practices. 
This is well illustrated by the Quanta Computer case. In that case, the 
                                                     
13. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 2–5, 511–49. 
14. See, e.g., Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1 (2006); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the 
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 36 (2000). 
15. 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). See discussion of this case infra at Part IV.B.3. 
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Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Federal Circuit’s ruling, yet 
left the Federal Circuit’s core licensing-law jurisprudence relatively 
intact despite numerous urgings through amicus briefs and academic 
literature to send a stern corrective message to the Federal Circuit as it 
had in several recent patent cases.16 This Article also highlights some 
areas that the Federal Circuit should give heightened attention to, given 
its highly influential role in the creation of licensing law. 
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF LICENSING AS A TRANSACTION 
MODEL AND ITS CRITICAL ROLE IN INNOVATION 
The story of the Federal Circuit’s role in licensing law must be 
understood in the context of the evolution of licensing as a business 
practice. Licensing—granting permission to use intellectual property—is 
as old as intellectual property itself. The oldest intellectual property 
statute, the 1474 Venetian Patent Act, mentions licensing in its text.17 
Even though licensing is not new, its prominence as a transaction model 
is new, driven by a shift in the United States economy. 
The economy has undergone a profound transformation in the past 
few decades, away from emphasizing the production of hard goods and 
toward the creation of ideas and information. Today, Americans live in 
an “information economy.” The commercial transactions of the 
information economy emphasize the creation, distribution, and use of 
intellectual property, services, and intangibles. As a result, the dominant 
transaction model has changed from sales contracts to information 
licenses.18 Licensing has emerged as an important transaction model 
because it enables innovation, and innovation is critical to the United 
                                                     
16. E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the 
rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.”); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 
(2006) (specifically objecting to the Federal Circuit’s approach). 
17. See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC’Y 
166, 177 (1948) (“[E]very person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this City, not 
previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it to the office of our General Welfare 
Board . . . . It being forbidden to every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any 
further device conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and license of the 
author for the term of 10 years.” (emphasis added)). 
18. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 2–14; see also MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS 
OF SOFTWARE (2004) (describing the development of the software business and the role that 
licenses played); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the 
Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 185–
86 (1999) (describing how licenses are the “unnoticed force” behind the open source software 
revolution). 
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States economy.19 As explained below, there are two types of innovation 
in the information economy: technological innovation and business-
model innovation. Licensing is at the heart of each. 
A.  Technological Innovation: Licenses to Build Products 
Licensing is a tool used by producers to build innovative products. 
The basic personal computer system (“PC”) provides a good illustration. 
A PC runs operating-system software, such as GNU/Linux or Microsoft 
Windows. Although many see the “open source” GNU/Linux software 
and the “binary use” Microsoft Windows software20 as polar opposites in 
many respects,21 they share one important feature: both are built on an 
array of licenses.22 
If a PC is running Windows software, then the user is running 
software created by dozens of programmers who are not employed by 
Microsoft. Windows software includes many lines of code written by 
third parties, small and large. It also includes inventions that are covered 
by third-party patents and depends upon third-party information, 
including trade secrets. Licensing is the primary legal tool that Microsoft 
uses to include third-party technology in its Windows product. The 
operating system may be called Microsoft Windows, but it is a more 
innovative product than Microsoft could create alone because of the 
third-party technology included via licensing.23 
If the PC is running the GNU/Linux operating system, then licensing 
has also played a key role in the operating system’s creation.24 Linus 
                                                     
19. Indeed, some believe that innovation is America’s sole remaining competitive advantage. See 
generally 3 DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
AMERICAN GROWTH RESURGENCE (2005); 3 DALE W. JORGENSON, ECONOMETRICS: GROWTH IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE (2002); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A 
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY (1999). 
20. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free Software 
Movement’s Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1019–21 (2005) (explaining the distinction 
between “open source” and “binary use” software). 
21. See ROBERT YOUNG & WENDY GOLDMAN ROHM, UNDER THE RADAR: HOW RED HAT 
CHANGED THE SOFTWARE BUSINESS—AND TOOK MICROSOFT BY SURPRISE 81 (1999) (discussing 
open source products versus “binary” products). 
22. A hot topic in the open source community is whether there are, perhaps, too many varieties of 
open source licenses. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License Proliferation: Helpful 
Diversity or Hopeless Confusion?, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009). 
23. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 
776–92 (2008) (describing how technology companies such as Microsoft and Sun Microsystems 
improve their products by acquiring third-party technology). 
24. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING 1–8, 51–69 (2005). 
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Torvalds is known as the author of the Linux kernel, yet Torvalds did 
not write most of the code that comprises Linux today. Linux is the 
result of the collaboration of hundreds of different programmers25 who 
combine their work.26 From a legal point of view, Linux was created by 
hundreds of licenses exchanged between the contributors to the Linux 
project. Furthermore, Linux is only part of the operating system (the 
kernel). Licensing is also the basis for combining the Linux kernel with 
GNU software from the Free Software Foundation27 (hence GNU/Linux) 
and other third-party code to create a complete operating system.28 
B.  Technological Innovation: Licenses to Create Customer Solutions 
After technology is built, the producer often wants to maximize the 
way that it interacts with other technologies so that the product is useful 
to end users. Again, the PC provides a good illustration. A PC may have 
a CPU produced by Dell, a pointing device developed by LogiTech, a 
microprocessor designed by AMD and fabricated by NEC, a keyboard 
manufactured by IBM, speakers by Bose, and software written by 
Microsoft, Mozilla, Apache, and Adobe. It may also connect to the 
Internet because of technology created using standards by IETF29 and 
W3C,30 and telephony provided by AT&T. In order for the PC to work 
as a useful customer system, all of these entities had to share technology, 
information, or intellectual property. Licensing allows this sharing to 
occur. 
                                                     
25. Eric S. Raymond wrote the most famous essays on this collaboration: The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar, Homesteading the Noosphere, and The Magic Cauldron. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE 
CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE BY AN 
ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 19, 65, 113 (2001). 
26. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 172–79 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004). 
27. See generally RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS 
OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 28 (2002) (Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation and the 
GNU software-development project), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/84washlrev199n27.pdf. 
28. See Richard M. Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement, in 
OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION, 53, 65–66 (DiBona et al. eds., 
1 999 ) ,  p er ma ne n t  c o p y  a v a i l a b l e  a t  http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev199n28.pdf. 
29. See IETF Overview, http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009), 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n29.pdf. 
30. See W3C in 7 Points, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Points/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2009), 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n30.pdf; see 
generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Policy and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002). 
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C.  Business-Model Innovation: Licenses to Distribute Products 
One feature of the information economy is the innovative ways that 
distributors of information products have invented to get products to 
market.31 Continuing with our PC example, we can see that PC software 
developers distribute their products through Value Added Resellers 
(VARs), Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), distributors (e.g., 
Ingram), and retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart). Software is distributed 
electronically through email attachments, chat rooms, and via download 
from thousands of web sites, web pages, and bulletin boards.32 Software 
gets distributed in cereal boxes and with the morning newspaper. It’s not 
hard to find software anymore; it’s hard to avoid software finding you. 
What legal tool underlies these diverse distribution practices? The 
answer is licensing. 
D.  Business-Model Innovation: Licenses to Use Products 
As I have explored in detail elsewhere,33 end-user licensing enables 
PC-software developers to provide users with a variety of information 
products at a variety of price points and for a variety of uses.34 Software 
publishers come in all shapes and sizes and with a multitude of 
                                                     
31. See Christine Mumford, Businesses Advised to Diversify Content, Tactics to Keep Up with 
Changing Web, E-COMMERCE L. DAILY (Dec. 12, 2007), 
 http://www.bna.com/products/ip/ecdm.htm (stating that customers can obtain information in many 
places through many means and because of this, Gannett Co. has changed its “newsrooms to 
information centers . . . delivering information when and where a customer wants it, on whatever 
platform—be it in a traditional browser, on a blackberry, an iPod, or a widget on a Web page” 
(quoting Craig Dubow, president and CEO of Gannet Co. Dubow, who attributes this change to 
Internet entrepreneurs and fierce competition)), permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n31.pdf; see also Kim Komando, Avoid 
Hassles; Let Sites Run Stores, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at E2 (describing a wide variety of 
options for product distribution via on-line stores for small and large businesses provided by 
Amazon.com, Yahoo, and eBay). 
32. See Benjamin J. Romano, Microsoft to Add “Community Games,” SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 
2008, at C1, C4 (describing on-line distribution and use of games). 
33. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for 
Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious]; Robert 
W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Software 
and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891 (1998) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, The 
License Is the Product]; Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass 
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996). 
34. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Romano, Microsoft Builds Virtualization Vision, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2008, at E1, E4 (reporting on licensing and pricing changes in light of new virtualization 
technology). 
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objectives. Universities, non-profit organizations, individuals, 
collections of individuals, and small and large firms all develop and 
license software to end-users.35 Free and open source software again 
provides a powerful example. Because of open source licensing, 
software users have the freedom to add new features and fix bugs and 
the legal ability to hire others to do the same.36 End-user licensing also 
allows software developers to offer packages of software and services; 
flexible client-server computing-usage models; and the same code to 
business users at one price, home users for a lower price, academic users 
for yet a lower price, and charitable organizations for free. In sum, end-
user licensing is a key component of business-model innovation in the 
information economy. 
II.  EVOLUTION OF LICENSING LAW 
A.  A Body of Law Takes Shape 
In one sense there has always been “licensing law.” License 
transactions existed, so therefore practicing lawyers and courts had to 
apply legal principles to these transactions.37 For instance, they had to 
determine whether the offer, acceptance, and consideration were 
adequate to create a contract. In a dispute over the meaning of 
contractual language, they had to determine what canons of construction 
should apply. In case of breach of contract, they had to fix appropriate 
remedies. And so on. In other words, licensing law existed before the 
label attached. 
Only in recent times have scholars become aware of “licensing law” 
as a distinct body of law, although it is a looser and less formalized body 
of law (at least at this point in time) than many bodies of law such as real 
property law, tort law,38 or even traditional contract law for the sale of 
                                                     
35. See Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33, at 897–98 (listing several non-
profit organizations that employ end-user licenses). 
36. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 75, 75–76 (2002); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 18, at 181. 
37. See generally STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 
OPERATIONS (1995) (discussing law and practice of licensing). 
38. Even though tort law now is considered “old school,” its acceptance as a body of law only 
dates back to the turn of the century. In 1941, Professor William L. Prosser commented in his first 
treatise on the law of torts that there was no recognition of torts as a distinct branch of law in the 
mid to late 1800s, and as late as 1871 “the leading American legal periodical said that ‘We are 
inclined to think that Torts is not a proper subject for a law book.’” See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 23–24 (1st ed. 1941). 
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goods.39 There is a large and diverse collection of laws that bear on and 
shape licenses.40 
Contract law is one of the most important ingredients in licensing law. 
Licenses are contracts, so licensing law fundamentally involves contract 
law.41 The principle is simple, but the reality is complex. Contract law 
related to licensing comes from a wide variety of different sources, 
including the common law, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC 2”), and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.42 Besides 
contract law, intellectual property law is an important aspect of licensing 
law. Intellectual property law influences licenses in a variety of ways. 
Intellectual property law provides contract rules in some instances, such 
as a statute of frauds for exclusive copyright licenses.43 In other cases, it 
provides the backdrop for licenses and influences their content and 
interpretation.44 In still other cases, the fact that intellectual property is 
the subject of the contract places boundaries around freedom of contract. 
These boundaries, expressed in terms of antitrust, misuse, and 
preemption, are an important aspect of licensing law.45 
The contract law applicable to license transactions began as common 
law, and has never changed for pure intellectual-property licenses, such 
as patent and trademark licenses.46 However, with the rise of the 
software industry, many courts began to look on software transactions as 
akin to sales of goods (as they often seemed, as the software was 
embedded in computer hardware or distributed in boxes). Thus, many 
courts looked to UCC 2 as the primary source of contract law.47 
                                                     
39. See generally U.C.C. Art. 2 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). 
40. For example: contract, intellectual property, consumer protection, constitutional, and antitrust 
law. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 14–39. 
41. See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[A] license is a 
contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.” (internal citations omitted)). Some 
in the free and open software community have argued that open source licenses are not contracts, 
but that argument is questionable. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in 
License Contracts: Tales From a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 345–
46 (2009). 
42. See id. 
43. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2000). 
44. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989) (construing license grant 
with reference to copyright policy). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (antitrust); 
Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. American Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (misuse). 
46. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 14–15. 
47. Id. at § 15-18. 
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In the 1990s, many people began to see the need for a cohesive body 
of contract law for licensing software and information.48 The 
organizations that created the Uniform Commercial Code—the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and 
the American Law Institute (ALI)—initially decided to address it by 
adding it to the agenda of the re-write of UCC 2, which was already in 
progress.49 When this approach proved to be inadequate, they set out to 
create a separate article of the UCC to deal specifically with licenses.50 
This statute was to be known as UCC Article 2B (UCC Article 2 for 
sales, 2A for leases, and 2B for licenses).51 
B.  The UCC Article 2B and Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA) Experiment 
The Article 2B project created intense debate, especially about the 
interplay between contract law and intellectual property law,52 
enforceability of mass-market licenses,53 and use of electronic self-
help.54 The ALI eventually withdrew its support. Nonetheless, NCCUSL 
                                                     
48. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281 (1993). 
49. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and 
Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994). 
50. See Thom Weidlich, Commission Plans New U.C.C. Article: Committee Prepares to Draft 
Proposal on Licensing, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at B1. 
51. See id. 
52. See U.C.I.T.A. § 105 (2000) (“Relation to Federal Law”); David McGowan, Free 
Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, 
Information Transactions, and “Aggressive Neutrality,” 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998); 
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property 
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998). In response to criticisms about the intellectual 
property/contract law interplay, the 2002 Amendments to UCITA limit a licensor’s ability to 
prohibit reverse engineering by contract. U.C.I.T.A. § 118 (2002) (“Terms Relating to 
Interoperability and Reverse Engineering”); see also Jonathan Band, Closing the Interoperability 
Gap: NCCUSL’s Adoption of a Reverse Engineering Exception in UCITA, COMPUTER & INTERNET 
LAW, May 2002, at 1. Compare this approach to the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), discussed infra at Part VI.A. 
53. See U.C.I.T.A. §§ 112–13 (2000) (“Manifesting Assent”; “Opportunity to Review”); id. § 209 
(“Mass-Market License”); Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33; Mark A. 
Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 111 (1999). 
54. See U.C.I.T.A. § 815 (“Right to Possession and Prevent Use”); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and 
the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); David Freidman, In Defense 
of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen’s “Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help,” 
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151 (1998). NCCUSL’s 2002 Amendments to UCITA ban the use of 
electronic self-help, even if the parties agree to it. See U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (“Limitations on Electronic 
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decided to move forward and renamed the project the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). NCCUSL approved 
UCITA in 1999, and Maryland and Virginia enacted it shortly 
thereafter.55 Since that time, however, no other state has enacted UCITA, 
and several states have passed legislation purporting to preclude any 
contractual choice of law choosing UCITA.56 
C.  The 2003 Amendments to UCC 2 
NCCUSL and ALI set out in the early 1950s to create a modern code 
of contract law for sales of goods. This new code, UCC 2, was 
specifically tailored to fit goods-related sales (i.e., as opposed to sales of 
things like services or leases of goods). Although UCC 2 is now 
considered mainstream, its adoption by the states, at the time, proved to 
take a relatively long period and was often controversial.57 
As information-related transactions (including licenses) began to 
emerge with increasing frequency and disputes about them began to 
come before the courts, judges often looked to UCC 2 as a source of law, 
despite that fact that, traditionally, the common law applied to 
intellectual property licenses and services contracts.58 Sometimes courts 
applied UCC 2 because the transaction at issue resembled a sale of 
goods, but often the court applied UCC 2 simply because it provided a 
comprehensive and readily ascertainable set of contract principles with 
which the court was familiar.59 However, some commentators do not 
believe this is sound,60 and an increasing number of courts have also 
                                                     
Self-Help”). 
55. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-
501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (2006). 
56. Iowa, North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia have passed such legislation in various 
forms. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 554D.125 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 
(2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2463a (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15 (LexisNexis 2008). 
Legislation to prevent the application of UCITA has come to be known as “bomb shelter” 
legislation. NCCUSL responded to some of the criticisms of UCITA by passing a series of 
amendments in 2002, but no additional states have adopted UCITA. Note that Maryland and 
Virginia adopted UCITA prior to the 2002 Amendments. 
57. See Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA and the Continuing Evolution of Digital Licensing Law, 
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., March 2004, at 10, 10–11 (describing the adoption process for UCC 
2 and comparing it to the adoption process for UCITA). 
58. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
59. Id. 
60. See, e.g., Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. 
REV. 459 (2000). 
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been circumspect.61 
In 1991 when NCCUSL appointed a Drafting Committee to revise 
UCC 2, the issue of UCC 2’s applicability to information transactions 
was placed squarely on the table.62 The UCC 2 process turned out to be 
long and difficult for a variety of reasons.63 ALI passed a draft in 1999, 
but NCCUSL did not.64 Eventually, the Drafting Committee was 
reconstituted, a new Reporter chosen, and the scope of the project 
narrowed from a complete rewrite to a series of amendments, which 
came to be known as the 2003 Amendments to Uniform Commercial 
Code Article 2—Sales.65 
One of the issues that vexed the Drafting Committee was how to 
distinguish between transactions in goods and transactions in 
information. Ultimately, the Drafting Committee reiterated that UCC 2 
was never intended to apply to information and revised UCC 2 to make 
the point clearer.66 According to Reporter Henry Gabriel and Drafting 
Committee Chairman William Henning: “[T]he definition of ‘goods’ 
was changed to make clear what has always been true—the term does 
not include information.”67 As to transactions that include both goods 
and information, the Official Comments state that it is up to the courts to 
determine whether a transaction is entirely within UCC 2 or whether 
UCC 2 should apply to only part of the transaction.68 
                                                     
61. See, e.g., iLAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 
2002) (stating “Article 2 technically does not, and certainly will not in the future, govern software 
licenses, but for the time being, the Court will assume it does” and noting a “legislative void” of 
useful contract law for licenses). 
62. See generally Nimmer, supra note 49. 
63. See generally Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never 
Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999). 
64. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: REVISED 
ARTICLE 1 AND AMENDED ARTICLE 2—SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS SUPPLEMENT 49–52 (2005). 
65. Id. 
66. See U.C.C. § 2-103(k) (2003). 
67. See Henry Deeb Gabriel & William H. Henning, Introduction to 2003 AMENDMENTS TO 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2—SALES 1, 2 (LexisNexis 2003); see also UCC 2-103(k) 
(providing that the term “goods” does not include information). 
68. U.C.C. § 2-103 cmt. 7 (“When a transaction includes both the sale of goods and the transfer 
of rights in information, it is up to the courts to determine whether the transaction is entirely within 
or outside of this article . . . .”); see also the official Oklahoma Code Comment regarding UCC 2:  
[T]he definition of ‘goods’ in this article has been amended expressly to exclude 
information. . . . There are important differences that exist between goods and information in 
law, practice, under intellectual property laws and even under the First Amendment. Given 
these differences, a court fashioning the resolution of a dispute should not simply apply Article 
2 by analogy or under a predominate purpose test, but rather should consider the issue, federal 
policies and rules regarding information, the consequences of applying an Article 2 rule on 
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D. Retreat Back to the Common Law 
Whether one views UCITA as dead,69 dormant,70 or still dangerous,71 
the fact is that licensing law will not be codified any time soon.72 Article 
2 of the UCC could have covered licenses but in the end NCCUSL chose 
not to jump in. Thus, licensing law continues to evolve as common 
law.73 The Federal Circuit has stepped into this void, setting precedents 
                                                     
established practice, and other relevant considerations. 
OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105 cmt. 1 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (internal citations omitted). For 
two recent cases in which courts have wrestled with this issue, see Wachter Management Co. v. 
Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 751 (Kan. 2006) (addressing a contract including rights to 
software, installation services, training, and consulting, and ruling that UCC 2 applied to the 
transaction even though software services were an incidental part of the transaction) and TK Power, 
Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stressing that a case-by-case 
analysis is appropriate in software transactions because software packages vary depending on the 
needs of the customer; in this case, applying the common law because “most of the price was for the 
development of software code” and because the contract for the prototypes was for “knowledge, 
skill, and ability” rather than “for the actual material goods”). 
69. See L.J. KUTTEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE: PROTECTION, LIABILITY, LAW, FORMS § 10:8 
(2009) (describing UCITA as “dead”). 
70. Professor Nimmer argues that any final pronouncement about the viability of UCITA is 
premature judged in light of UCC 2’s long and often controversial journey toward widespread 
adoption. Nimmer, supra note 57; see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard 
Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 491 (2002) (“UCITA maintains 
the contextual, balanced approach to standard terms that can be found in the paper world.”); Nim 
Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643 (2003). 
71. See, e.g., David A. Szwak, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [U.C.I.T.A.]: 
The Consumer’s Perspective, 63 LA. L. REV. 27 (2002) (criticizing UCITA as a threat to 
consumers). 
72. The American Law Institute (ALI) has begun a project called the “Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts.” In ALI parlance, a “Principles” project differs from a “Restatement.” A 
Principles project is appropriate when the ALI believes the law is still in its formative stage. As a 
consequence, a Principles document “accounts for the case law and recommends best practices, 
without unduly hindering the law’s adaptability to future developments.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1 March 24, 2008). “Courts can apply the 
Principles as definitive rules, as a ‘gloss’ on the common law or U.C.C. Article 2, or not at all, as 
they see fit.” Id. at 2–3; see generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay on the Challenges of 
Drafting a Uniform Law of Software Contracting, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 925 (2006) 
(describing the Principles of Software Contracts project). 
73. See iLAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(noting a “legislative void” of useful contract law for licenses). Some of UCITA’s provisions have 
influenced the development of the common law. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (looking to UCITA for guidance on formation of contract issue); Rhone 
Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (looking to 
UCITA for guidance on bona fide purchaser rule in patent licensing case); AGT Int’l, Inc. v. Level 
3 Commc’ns, L.L.C., No. 02-CV-684, 2002 WL 31409879, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2002) 
(looking to UCITA for guidance on duration of object-code license where copy of software is 
delivered for fixed fee); see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Stop Mucking Up Copyright Law: A 
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that are shaping the landscape of licensing law. 
III.  CREATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT 
Until the 1980s, any federal circuit court in the United States could 
hear a patent-law appeal. This led to divergent results in patent cases and 
frequent forum shopping.74 Congress established the Federal Circuit to 
unify appellate jurisdiction for patent appeals.75 In doing so, Congress 
hoped to improve the climate for innovation by giving inventors a 
uniform body of judicial interpretations of patent law decided by judges 
with patent expertise.76 Since that time, the Federal Circuit has been a 
strong “manager and developer” of patent law.77 
Creation of the Federal Circuit did not change the appellate 
jurisdiction of regional federal appellate courts in federal copyright or 
trademark cases,78 or for state-law trade secret or contract issues arising 
out of diversity jurisdiction,79 at least not directly. Indirectly, however, 
things changed. The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
in cases where the plaintiff pleads a patent-law issue.80 As specified in 
28 U.S.C. § 1295, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of an 
appeal from a federal district court if the jurisdiction of that court was 
based, “in whole or in part,” on civil actions arising under “any Act of 
Congress relating to patents.”81 
                                                     
Proposal for a Federal Common Law of Contract, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 1027 (2004) (stating that 
this new federal common law could “accrete UCITA provisions into law as necessary if they 
provided the superior alternative to the existing contract law model or as gap fillers to another body 
of contract law”). 
74. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National 
Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 55–57 (1984); Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
75. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
76. See supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text. 
77. R. Polk Wager & Lee Petherbridge, supra note 4, at 1116. 
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). 
79. Contract issues may be litigated in state court or in federal court under its diversity 
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a), 1338 (2000). See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. 
Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 
(1988) (holding that a patent issue must appear in well-pleaded complaint). 
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). However, if the patent-law issue arises in the context of a case in 
which the trial court does not have jurisdiction under § 1338, such as a case in which only contract 
or copyright claims are pled, then the regional federal circuit (or perhaps a state appellate court for a 
claim based exclusively on state law) would have appellate jurisdiction, not the Federal Circuit. See 
Janicke, supra note 1, at 12. The literature on the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is voluminous. See, 
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Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction sweeps in many 
licensing-law cases. Naturally, the Federal Circuit decides cases that 
combine patent and contract-law issues. On top of that, its broad 
appellate jurisdiction often requires it to handle infringement and breach 
of contract issues that arise from copyright, trademark, and trade secret 
licenses.82 In other words, the Federal Circuit gets the opportunity to set 
precedents on a regular basis involving licenses of all types of 
intellectual property and involving all types of creative and innovative 
works. 
IV.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INFLUENCE IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LICENSING LAW 
A.  Defining “Influence” 
Sometimes it is easy to see one court’s influence over another; in fact, 
sometimes the influence is mandatory. A trial court is required to follow 
the precedents of the appellate courts in its jurisdiction. A panel of 
judges in a federal circuit must follow the decisions of prior panels. All 
courts must follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Outside of these contexts, however, it is harder to gauge influence. 
Cross-pollination of ideas is natural83 and encouraged across federal 
circuits,84 but how does one determine the influence that one peer 
appellate court has on another? Ultimately the matter comes down to 
two things: practicality and persuasiveness. As a practical matter, a court 
with a difficult issue to resolve and no binding precedents to apply will 
look to other courts for useful on-point or related cases. Then, for a court 
to adopt the decision of a non-binding jurisdiction, the court must find 
                                                     
e.g., John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The 
Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1835 (1996); Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 4; Larry D. Thompson Jr., Adrift on a Sea of 
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal 
Circuit, 92 GEO. L. J. 523 (2004). 
82. E.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (addressing breach-of-contract and 
copyright-infringement issues in open source software license); see also Gomulkiewicz, supra note 
41.  
83. In fact, circuits other than the Federal Circuit decide cases that influence patent licenses. See, 
e.g., Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the assignability of 
patent license); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979) (same); 
Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972) (same). 
84. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 838–39 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); Dreyfuss, supra note 2 at 60. 
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that the reasoning of the non-binding case is sound, sensible, and 
persuasive. With these principles of practicality and persuasiveness in 
mind, I have adopted two criteria to test the Federal Circuit’s influence 
in licensing law: absolute number of licensing-law cases decided 
between October 1, 1982 and February 15, 2008 compared to other 
jurisdictions; and the number of times the Federal Circuit has been cited, 
followed, or quoted by other courts in licensing-law issues within that 
time frame.  
B.  Number of Licensing-Law Cases Decided 
The number of Federal Circuit licensing-law cases is significant 
because the more cases decided, the greater the odds that another court 
will find a useful precedent to cite from the Federal Circuit’s “catalog” 
of licensing-law cases. Since its inception in 1982, the Federal Circuit 
has decided more than one hundred licensing-law cases.85 This is far 
more than any other federal circuit court in the same period of time. 
As shown in the table below, the number of Federal Circuit licensing-
law cases exceeds the totals, respectively, of the Ninth, Second, Fifth, 
and Seventh Circuits, all of which tend to handle a significant number of 
cases involving intellectual property. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has 
decided as many licensing-law cases as the combined total of the 
influential Ninth and Second Circuits. Not surprisingly, most of the 
Federal Circuit’s cases involved patent licensing, and most of the Ninth 
and Second Circuit cases involved copyright licensing.86 Trademark 
licensing cases were spread evenly across the circuits.87 However, the 
                                                     
85. Methodology: search of the BNA Intellectual Property Library database using BNA headnote 
numbers related to licensing of various types of intellectual property: patents, software, copyrights, 
trademarks, and trade secrets. The staff of the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library of the 
University of Washington School of Law ran these searches. The searches identified cases decided 
between the dates February 15, 2008 and October 1, 1982. For other articles using a similar 
methodology, see Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from 
the First Year of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2007-08); Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading 
State Cases, 1940–2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683 (2007). 
86. The Ninth Circuit decides many copyright cases because of its proximity to the movie 
industry. See White v. Samsung Elec. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the Ninth Circuit as the “Hollywood Circuit”). The Second Circuit decides 
many copyright cases because of its proximity to the publishing industry. See 1 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07[A], at 3–40 (2008) (referring to the 
influence of the Second Circuit in copyright-related cases). 
87. One would actually expect the Federal Circuit to have decided more cases in trademark 
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Federal Circuit decided more cases involving software and trade secret 
licensing. 
 
Licensing Cases 
10/1/1982 – 2/15/2008 
 Patent Software Copyright Trademark Trade 
Secrets 
TOTAL 
Fed. Cir. 90 13 3 3 4 113 
 
2d Cir. 1 0 36 10 0 47 
 
5th Cir. 0 6 9 11 0 26 
 
7th Cir. 8 7 13 11 2 41 
 
9th Cir. 5 7 38 12 3 65 
 
 
The number of software-licensing cases is particularly significant 
because software cases crop up in all circuits and tend to involve 
copyright and other non-patent issues.88 These Federal Circuit cases will 
be directly on point for courts looking for cases to apply. If a court takes 
an approach different than the Federal Circuit, it will create a circuit 
split.89 
                                                     
licensing because of its jurisdiction over appeals from the Trademark Office. However, it may be 
that most of these cases involve the underlying question of protectability rather than issues related to 
commercialization of trademarks (i.e., licensing). 
88. As software developers increasingly use patents to protect software, more cases involving 
software have come to the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
These cases tend to raise copyright, trade secret, and sometimes trademark issues as well as patent 
issues. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection For Software: Still a Work in Progress, 8 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445 (2002). As firms focus more on the importance of intellectual 
property as an asset in the information economy, many other types of transactions will also involve 
licenses to multiple types of intellectual property. 
89. The Federal Circuit decides any copyright, trademark, or trade secret issues applying the law 
of the circuit from which the case came. See Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1383 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). Often the Federal Circuit must intuit this precedent because the applicable circuit 
does not have any cases on point. See Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). In the early 1990s, the Federal Circuit avoided a conflict over the issue of whether reverse 
engineering software to discover unprotectable ideas was a Copyright Act “fair use.” The Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 
1992), is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1510 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Sony Corp. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Beyond the total number of cases, the Federal Circuit’s decisions 
address a wide range of issues. These issues run the gamut: implied 
licenses,90 federal-law preemption,91 enforceability of mass-market 
licenses,92 first sale,93 applicable law,94 canons of contract construction,95 
transferability,96 misuse,97 and antitrust.98 The sheer volume of Federal 
Circuit cases combined with the wide variety of issues that they address 
means that, as these issues crop up in other jurisdictions, courts looking 
for precedent naturally will consider adopting (and in many cases have 
adopted, as described in the next Section) precedent from the Federal 
Circuit. 
The range of issues enhances the possibility that even the Federal 
Circuit’s patent-licensing cases will prove to be influential. In the 
absence of an on-point copyright case, for example, a patent-licensing 
case often makes good analogy.99 Sometimes the distinction between 
copyright as a “thin” intellectual property right and patent as a “thick” 
intellectual property right justifies a difference in treatment between 
copyright and patent licensing,100 but on many occasions these 
differences do not justify distinctions in licensing law. Moreover, in 
software licensing where the software may be protected by both patents 
and copyrights, it may not be practicable to apply different licensing 
principles to the same transaction. 
 
 
                                                     
90. E.g., McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
91. E.g., Bowers, 320 F.3d 1317. 
92. Id. 
93. E.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
94. E.g., Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
95. E.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
96. E.g., Rhone Poulnec Agro S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
97. E.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
98. E.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
99. See, e.g., Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (examining whether copyright 
license or assignment can operate retrospectively); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 
973 (4th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that because patent law had a misuse doctrine, copyright law should 
too). In intellectual property cases, the Supreme Court has drawn on patent-law analogies, most 
famously in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (beta max case), and 
most recently in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) and eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (discussing injunctive relief in patent and copyright cases). 
100. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217. 
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C.  Citations to Federal Circuit Cases 
Many courts have cited to the Federal Circuit’s licensing-law 
jurisprudence.101 These courts include other federal circuit courts, 
federal district courts, and state courts. The relatively large number of 
citations shows that other courts have acknowledged the Federal 
Circuit’s leadership in this area. Looking more closely at the context of 
the citations reveals that on many occasions courts adopted the Federal 
Circuit’s approach.102 In several cases, including a leading case from the 
Eighth Circuit on Federal Copyright Act preemption, the court quoted 
from Federal Circuit case law.103 The Federal Circuit’s influence in 
licensing law is particularly noteworthy given its distinct lack of 
influence on areas outside of patent law, as several scholars have 
noted.104 
D.  Final Observations on the Federal Circuit’s “Influence” in 
Licensing Law 
Judging the Federal Circuit’s influence on licensing law is more art 
than science, of course.105 It seems beyond question that the degree of 
influence is more than trivial but less than dominant. The Federal Circuit 
is not the only voice, but it is an important voice and arguably one of the 
                                                     
101. See Appendix I. 
102. E.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Federal 
Circuit, including once for its interpretation of Ninth Circuit law); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo 
Cattle Co., 955 F.2d 1327, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We agree with the Federal Circuit that a 
simultaneous assignment and license-back of a mark is valid, where, as in this case, it does not 
disrupt continuity of the products or services associated with a given mark.”); EyeTicket Corp. v. 
Unisys Corp., 155 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535 (E.D. Va. 2001) (adopting Federal Circuit’s categories to 
classify licenses). 
103. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Foad 
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 828 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001); In re CFLC, Inc., 89 
F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Solutia, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 433 
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Natterman & Cie GmbH v. Bayer Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 253, 258 (E.D. Pa. 
2006). 
104. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 779. A study in the late 1990s indicated the Federal Circuit’s 
lack of influence in most areas of law. See William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation 
Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 277–78, 317–18 (1998). 
105. Some patent-law scholars have used methods of statistical analysis. For a recent example, 
see David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) and Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, 
Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2006). Other scholars have gleaned 
important and interesting insights using less “scientific” methods. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do 
Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005). 
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most important voices.106 Is the Federal Circuit more influential than the 
Second Circuit or Ninth Circuit? There is not enough evidence at this 
time to reach that conclusion. Given the pace of licensing-law cases 
coming out of the Federal Circuit, however, it seems safe to predict its 
continued and increasing influence.107 
It is also safe to predict that if the Supreme Court overturns the 
Federal Circuit’s licensing-law decisions, it will have an unusually large 
ripple effect. Almost anytime the Supreme Court reverses the Federal 
Circuit it affects the parties, the lower courts, and the industries that have 
come to rely on what seemed to be the established rule.108 The difference 
will be a difference in the order of magnitude. An adjustment to the 
Federal Circuit’s approach to licensing law will not just affect patentees 
and those who use patented inventions. Widespread adoption of Federal 
Circuit precedents means that an adjustment will also affect industries 
that base their activities on copyright, software, and information 
licensing. Furthermore, the reverberation will reach across all federal 
circuits and the decisions of state courts.109 
V.  THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
This section will describe the nature of the Federal Circuit’s 
licensing-law jurisprudence, primarily through the lens of its first sale 
cases, but also discussing cases that challenge licenses on preemption, 
misuse, and antitrust grounds. It will explore whether the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence is consistent with practices in other jurisdictions 
                                                     
106. See Appendix I, infra at 251. 
107. Given the importance of licensing transactions in the information economy, it is safe to 
assume that the absolute number of licensing-law cases will continue to be significant and will most 
likely continue to rise. 
108. See generally John Richards et al., Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream 
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006) (discussing 
Lexmark’s reliance on Mallinckrodt case). 
109. If the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is unfaithful to the intellectual property statutes or the 
cases that have construed them, then it goes without saying that the Federal Circuit’s course should 
be corrected. If an adjustment needs to be made, then an adjustment should be made. If that 
happens, then other courts and the public will fall into line as they must and always do. My point is 
simply that any adjustment made should be made with full awareness of the broader implications. 
See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty Payment 
Risks After MedImmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS. 381 (2007) (pointing out that the 
Supreme Court’s MedImmune decision had significant negative unintended consequences for the 
university technology-transfer community’s licensing practices). 
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and Supreme Court precedent, including the outcome of the recent 
Supreme Court case Quanta Computer.110 
A.  First Sale Cases 
We begin with a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on 
patent exhaustion (also know as “first sale”) because, as mentioned 
previously, this jurisprudence recently has attracted the attention of the 
United States Supreme Court.111 This area is very significant because of 
parallels and overlaps with copyright’s first sale doctrine. When 
software is involved, the code may be covered by both patents and 
copyrights, so the court must deal with patent and copyright first sale at 
the same time. 
The Federal Circuit’s first significant decision in this arena was 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.112 In that case, a manufacturer of 
medical equipment, Mallinckrodt, sold equipment labeled as “Single Use 
Only” to hospitals.113 When hospitals contracted with a service 
company, Medipart, to refurbish the equipment for reuse, Mallinckrodt 
sued Medipart for patent infringement and inducement to infringe.114 
The District Court ruled that the “Single Use Only” designation on the 
package did not prevent the refurbishment or the hospital’s further (i.e., 
second and subsequent) use under patent law.115 The Federal Circuit 
reversed.116 
The Federal Circuit held that patent exhaustion only occurs when the 
                                                     
110. Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
111. This area has also attracted the attention of commentators. E.g., Mehdi Ansari, LG Elecs., 
Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc.: Solving the Foundry Problem in the Semiconductor Industry, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (2007); John W. Osborn, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A 
Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 643 (2004); 
William P. Skladony, Commentary on Select Patent Exhaustion Principles in Light of the LG 
Electronics Cases, 47 INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. REV. 235 (2006). 
112. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For articles discussing the Mallinckrodt decision at the time, 
see James B. Koback, Jr., Contracting Around Patent Exhaustion: Some Thoughts About the 
CAFC’s Mallinckrodt Decision, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMAK OFF. SOC’Y 550 (1993) and Richard H. 
Stern, The Unobserved Demise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in US Patent Law, 15 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 460 (1993). For a more recent article, see Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of 
the Scope of Patent Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 
(2007). 
113. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702. 
114. Id. 
115. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
116. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 709. 
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patentee makes an unconditional sale. By placing an express restriction 
on reuse, the patent holder could create a restricted license rather than an 
unconditional sale.117 According to the Federal Circuit, “Unless the 
condition violates some other law or policy (in the patent field, notably 
the misuse or antitrust law, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co.), 
private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of 
sale.”118 
The Federal Circuit elaborated upon Mallinckrodt five years later in 
B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.119 In that case, the 
Federal Circuit explained: 
[A]n unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the 
patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device 
thereafter. The theory behind this rule is that in such a 
transaction, the patentee has bargained for, and received, an 
amount equal to the full value of the goods. This exhaustion 
doctrine, however, does not apply to an expressly conditional 
sale or license. In such a transaction, it is more reasonable to 
infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the 
value of the “use” rights conferred by the patentee. As a result, 
express conditions accompanying the sale or license of a 
patented product are generally upheld.120 
The court reiterated, however, that “conditions that violate some law or 
equitable consideration are unenforceable.”121 
The Federal Circuit clarified, in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-
Type Corp.,122 that not all manner of restrictions or conditions would 
turn transactions from first sales into conditional sales or licenses. At 
issue in Repeat-O-Type was a statement in the user instruction manual 
stating that users should “discard old print cartridge[s] immediately.”123 
The court ruled that to be enforceable the condition or restriction must 
be explicit: “A seller’s intent, unless embodied in an enforceable 
contract, does not create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, 
sell, or modify a patented product as long as a reconstruction of the 
                                                     
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 708 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 703. 
119. 124 F.3d 1419, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
120. Id. at 1426 (internal citations omitted). 
121. Id. 
122. 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
123. Id. at 1447. 
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patented combination is avoided.”124 The court stated that this 
“noncontractual intention is simply the seller’s hope or wish, rather than 
an enforceable restriction.”125 
A decade after Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit revisited the issue of 
patent exhaustion, this time in a context very different from medical 
devices or computer equipment. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling126 and 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs127 dealt with the licensing model for 
genetically modified seeds.128 Monsanto licensed its biotechnology for 
“Round Up Ready” seeds to seed-distribution companies who then 
licensed the seeds to end-user growers.129 This technology allows 
growers to use the pesticide “Round Up” for weed control without 
killing the genetically modified plants.130 Monsanto’s license allowed 
the seed distributors to incorporate Monsanto technology into the 
distributors’ germ plasma, subject to certain conditions, including a 
condition that the seed distributors would not sell seed to growers unless 
the grower signed a Monsanto end-user license agreement.131 The end-
user license with growers included the following restrictions: the seed 
                                                     
124. Id. at 1453 (emphasis added). 
125. Id.; see also Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newman, J.) 
(ruling in an action under Section 337 of the Tariff Act to stop the repurposing of “single use” 
cameras, that package instructions were not in the form of an enforceable contractual agreement, so 
therefore the “single use” condition was not enforceable). 
126. 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
127. 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
128. First sale legal issues aside, the Monsanto line of cases raises interesting, challenging, and 
controversial ethical issues about food and agricultural policy. These issues, though important, are 
outside the scope of this article. My analysis focuses solely on Monsanto’s general right to use 
licensing for its business-model innovation, not on Monsanto’s business objective in using its 
licensing scheme. For commentary on the latter, see Peter Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints Via 
Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
1053 (2006); Richards et al., supra note 108; Jason Savich, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative 
Impact of Patent Exhaustion on Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (2007); 
The End of Cheap Food, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2007, at 11. See also a news article by Kristi 
Heim, Agricultural Aid a Hard Sell, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at B1, which reports concerns 
that the Gates Foundation’s new agricultural aid initiatives will be too technology- and market-
oriented, including concerns about use of genetically modified crops. Heim also reports that 
according to a farmer from Common Ground Farmers, a farming NGO, farmers share local seeds 
with other farmers and cannot afford to buy seeds, let alone more expensive transgenic varieties that 
often require fertilizer and pesticide. Id. She quotes the farmer as saying, “People do not know the 
hidden agenda behind it . . . that once [farmers] get the high-yielding seed, they have to keep buying 
it. Once you get in the system, then getting out becomes difficult.” Id. 
129. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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could be used only for planting a single crop; no transfer of seed for re-
planting; prohibition on research or experimentation; and payment of a 
technology fee.132 
Scruggs, a grower, argued that he was not bound by any of the license 
conditions under the doctrine of patent exhaustion.133 The Federal 
Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “[t]here was no unrestricted sale 
because the use of the seeds by seed growers was conditioned on 
obtaining a license from Monsanto.”134 Moreover, as to the second 
generation of seeds, there was no “sale” by Monsanto (or the seed 
distributor for that matter) at all, so there was no “first sale” under patent 
law.135 
Shortly after the Scruggs decision, the Federal Circuit again took up 
the issue of patent exhaustion in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom 
Electronics, Inc.136 In that case, LG Electronics licensed certain patents 
to Intel.137 LG Electronics’ license with Intel contained a provision 
prohibiting use of LG Electronics’ patents with non-Intel devices.138 
Further, Intel was required to notify its customers of the prohibition in 
any agreements that Intel created with its customers.139 Intel then sold 
chipsets covered by the patents to PC manufacturers.140 Intel provided 
notice of its LG Electronics license limitation to the PC 
manufacturers.141 
When some of Intel’s customers failed to obtain the appropriate 
patent rights from LG Electronics, LG Electronics sued for patent 
infringement. The defendants argued that LG Electronics’ patent rights 
were exhausted because they bought the chipsets from Intel in an 
unconditional sale.142 The Federal Circuit disagreed. It held that the sale 
was conditional because Intel was limited by its license with LG 
Electronics as to how Intel could pass on patent rights to Intel’s chipsets, 
                                                     
132. Id. at 1333. 
133. As explained infra at Part V.B.2, the McFarling case did not squarely address the first sale 
issue. 
134. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336. 
135. Id. 
136. 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
137. Id. at 1368. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1369–70. 
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and because Intel provided notice to its consumers of the limitation.143 
Because the sale was conditional, the patent rights of LG Electronics 
were not exhausted.144 Thus, LG Electronics had the right to assert its 
patents against unlicensed “downstream” uses. 
B.  Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s First Sale Jurisprudence: 
Comparison to Supreme Court Precedent 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Quanta Computer, 
reviewing the Federal Circuit’s ruling in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom 
Electonics, Inc., reveals what the Supreme Court thinks about the 
Federal Circuit’s entire line of first sale cases. The Federal Circuit’s 
Mallinckrodt line of cases was clearly in jeopardy in Quanta Computer. 
The Supreme Court presumably took the case because the U.S. Solicitor 
General’s office argued that from Mallinckrodt to LG Electronics, the 
Federal Circuit had moved licensing law in a direction contrary to good 
public policy. As discussed below, the Supreme Court, in effect, largely 
accepted the Federal Circuit’s core approach from the Mallinckrodt line 
of cases, even while unanimously overturning LG Electronics on other 
grounds. In other words, this particular reversal fundamentally amounts 
to an affirmation: the Federal Circuit lost the battle but won the war. 
1.  From Mallinckrodt to Monsanto 
The comparison begins with the Federal Circuit’s foundational case 
on first sales versus conditional sales, Mallinckrodt.145 The first question 
to ask is: Did the Federal Circuit ignore the Supreme Court’s case law? 
It would be hard to argue that it did. Judge Newman’s opinion146 cites 
more than twenty Supreme Court cases147 and discusses or quotes 
several of them, including two of the most important cases in this area, 
                                                     
143. Id. at 1370. 
144. Id. 
145. According to the Brief of the United States as amicus curiae on the petition for writ of 
certiorari in Quanta Computer, “The foundation of the Federal Circuit’s approach to the first sale 
doctrine is Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (1992).” Brief of the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 14, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-937). 
146. Judge Newman also wrote the opinion in the Jazz Photo case in which the court ruled that 
“single use” package instructions were not sufficient to form an enforceable contract. See supra note 
125. She was also on the panel that decided LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 
discussed supra at note 136. 
147. See generally Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.148 and 
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.149 Indeed, the 
opening paragraphs of Mallinckrodt address the district court’s ruling in 
relation to General Talking Pictures: 
[T]he district court held that no restriction whatsoever could be 
imposed under the patent law, whether or not the restriction was 
enforceable under some other law, and whether or not this was a 
first sale to the purchaser without notice. This ruling is incorrect, 
for if Mallinckrodt’s restriction was a valid condition of the sale, 
then in accordance with General Talking Pictures Corp. v. 
Western Electric Co., it was not excluded from enforcement 
under the patent law.150 
If the court in Mallinckrodt did not ignore Supreme Court precedent, 
then the next question is: Did the Federal Circuit misconstrue the 
precedent? In Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit was reviewing the 
district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment.151 As such, the 
Federal Circuit had to make a key factual assumption: that the “single 
use only” condition was legally sufficient.152 According to the court, 
“The movant MediPart did not dispute actual notice of the restriction. 
Thus we do not decide whether the form of the restriction met the legal 
requirements of notice or sufficed as a ‘label license.’”153 The court then 
stated, “On this motion for summary judgment, there was no issue of 
whether this form of license gave notice of the restriction. Notice was 
not disputed.”154 
Thus the narrow issue decided by the court in Mallinckrodt was 
whether a patent holder could create an enforceable (via patent law) 
restricted license or conditional sale. Not that the patent holder did, but 
that it could.155 The court reasoned that Mallinckrodt could create a 
                                                     
148. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
149. 304 U.S. 175 (1938). 
150. 976 F.2d at 701 (internal citations omitted). 
151. Id. (“On review of these issues in the posture in which the case reaches us . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 703. 
155. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because 
the district court improperly instructed the jury that it must find Braun guilty of patent misuse if 
Braun placed any use restrictions on its sales of the SafSite® valves . . . we remand the case for 
further proceedings.”). 
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restrictive license because a patent gives the patentee the right to exclude 
“use” of an invention,156 and this right can be waived in whole or in part 
(i.e., conditioned or restricted).157 
For support, the court cited several Supreme Court cases that 
approved of conditional sales or restrictive licenses, including General 
Talking Pictures and American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,158 a case that 
involved a “[l]icensed to use once only” notice that had been stamped on 
metal ties for cotton bales.159 The Federal Circuit quoted liberally from 
General Talking Pictures, in which the Supreme Court said: 
That a restrictive license is legal seems clear. . . . [T]he patentee 
may grant a license “upon any condition the performance of 
which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the 
grant of patent is entitled to secure.” . . . The practice of granting 
licenses for a restricted use is an old one. So far as appears, its 
legality has never been questioned.160 
Summing up the Supreme Court’s case law in this area, the Federal 
Circuit observed: “Viewing the entire group of these early [Supreme 
Court] cases, it appears that the Court simply applied, to a variety of 
factual situations, the rule of contract law that sale may be 
conditioned.”161 And if condition or restriction is within the scope of the 
patent grant, such as a patentee’s right to exclude use of the patented 
invention, “then violation of the restriction may be remedied by action 
for patent infringement.”162 
But is this a fair assessment of Supreme Court precedent? One case 
that the Mallinckrodt opinion cites but does not discuss extensively is 
United States v. Univis Lens Co.,163 a case decided by the Supreme Court 
four years after General Talking Pictures and cited extensively by the 
Supreme Court in Quanta Computer. Some consider the Univis Lens 
                                                     
156. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). 
157. The Federal Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in E. Bement & Sons v. National 
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) for the proposition that “[a]s in other areas of commerce, 
private parties may contract as they choose, provided no law is violated thereby.” Mallinckrodt, 976 
F.2d at 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
158. 106 U.S. 89 (1882). 
159. Id. at 91. The Court also discussed the limited license in Providence Rubber Co. v. 
Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788 (1869). 
160. 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (internal citations omitted). 
161. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.3d at 708. 
162. Id. at 709. 
163. 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
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case to be the Supreme Court’s last and definitive word on patent 
exhaustion.164 Did the Federal Circuit give Univis Lens its due, or did it 
misperceive its importance?165 The best interpretation of the General 
Talking Pictures and Univis Lens cases, when read in context, supports 
the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the latter case. 
General Talking Pictures and the cases that it cites establish the 
following framework for a patentee’s ability to control use of a patented 
product: The patentee may make an unconditional sale of a product 
under its patent. If the patentee does so, its rights under the patent are 
exhausted and the user is free to use the product without further 
interference by the patent holder. Alternatively, the patentee can make a 
sale or license that conditions or restricts usage. If the patentee does so, 
the person who received a product under the patent may use the product 
only as conditioned or limited by the patentee. If the recipient uses the 
product in another way, he or she infringes the patent.  
However, a patentee’s ability to enforce restrictions or conditions on 
use is not absolute. First, it must be done in an enforceable contract. 
Second, the restriction or condition must be within the scope of the 
patent’s exclusive rights. Third, restrictions or conditions are subject to 
other laws, such as antitrust law and the doctrine of patent misuse. If a 
patentee’s contractual condition or restriction is outside the enumerated 
exclusive rights granted by a patent or violates some other law,166 then 
use of the product contrary to the condition or restriction does not 
infringe the patent. 
With this framework in mind, General Talking Pictures and Univis 
Lens fit neatly together. General Talking Pictures is fundamentally a 
patent-infringement case. In that case, both a manufacturer and user 
ignored the license restrictions imposed by the patentee.167 
Consequently, the Supreme Court found that the manufacturer and user 
infringed the patent by doing so.168 
                                                     
164. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 
Inc., 553 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-937) (characterizing Univis Lens as the last Supreme Court case 
that “squarely addressed” the patent exhaustion doctrine). 
165. Perhaps there is general confusion about the significance of the Univis Lens case. See 
generally John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on 
Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 643 (2004) 
(“Sixty-two years later, Univis Lens is still misinterpreted.”). 
166. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
167. See General Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 126. 
168. Note that Justice Black’s dissent, id. at 128–33, echoes many of the objections voiced by 
petitioner and the United States as amicus curiae in LG Electronics. 
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Univis Lens, on the other hand, is fundamentally an antitrust case. In 
Univis Lens, the patentee was using a license condition to enforce resale 
price maintenance.169 In other words, the patentee was using license 
restrictions in violation of antitrust law. The Court in Univis Lens barely 
mentioned General Talking Pictures, presumably because there was 
little need to cite it in the context of antitrust. Justice Stone’s opinion 
instead, and appropriately so, focused repeatedly on the “price-fixing 
features” of the licensing scheme, which the Court ruled were in 
violation of the Sherman Act.170 In other words, Univis Lens does not 
overrule or even refine the rule in General Talking Pictures—it simply 
applied it. 
2.  The Monsanto Cases 
This brings us to the more recent Federal Circuit decisions in 
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling171 and Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs.172 What 
have these cases added, if anything, to the Mallinckrodt decision on the 
issue of patent exhaustion? The McFarling case adds little to 
Mallinckrodt.173 The primary issue in McFarling was the enforceability 
of a condition in Monsanto’s end-user (grower) Technology Agreement 
that restricted use of seeds incorporating Monsanto’s Roundup Ready 
technology to “a single season” and prohibited the grower from saving 
for replanting any second-generation seed produced by the first.174 
McFarling argued that this restriction constituted patent misuse because 
Monsanto had impermissibly tied an unpatented product to a patented 
one.175 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that “[t]ying can constitute 
patent misuse” but stated that “McFarling does not raise a typical tying 
allegation, and the mere recitation of the word ‘tying’ is not sufficient to 
                                                     
169. See 316 U.S. 241, 253 (1941). 
170. See id. at 243–54. 
171. 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit also ruled on other aspects of the 
dispute between Monsanto and McFarling. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (remedies); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(forum selection). 
172. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
173. McFarling had signed the Technology Agreement so, as in Mallinckrodt, the validity of the 
license restriction was not challenged on that basis. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
174. See id. at 1339. 
175. Id. at 1341. 
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state a patent misuse defense.”176 
The court then went on to assess what it considered the unique feature 
of the case: “the Technology Agreement does not impose a restriction on 
the use of the product purchased under the license but rather imposes a 
restriction on the use of the goods made by the licensed product.”177 In 
other words, the license restriction applied to the second-generation seed 
that resulted from the crops produced from the first-generation seed. The 
key question, according to the court, was whether this restriction reached 
“beyond the scope of the patent grant”?178 If it did, it could (at least 
potentially) constitute a misuse of Monsanto’s patent. The answer to the 
question was: “Because the ‘435 patent would read on all generations of 
soybeans produced, we hold that the restrictions in the Technology 
Agreement prohibiting the replanting of the second generation of 
ROUNDUP READY® soybeans do not extend Monsanto’s rights under 
the patent statute.”179 
The McFarling decision broke no new ground on the rules applicable 
to assessing a license restriction. If the court had found Monsanto’s 
restriction to be an illegal tying arrangement or beyond the scope of the 
patent, then it would have refused to enforce the restriction. Like the 
Supreme Court in Univis Lens, the Federal Circuit in McFarling reached 
its conclusion simply by applying the framework articulated by the 
Supreme Court in General Talking Pictures. 
The Scruggs case presents facts similar to McFarling. In Scruggs, the 
grower had not signed Monsanto’s Technology Agreement,180 but it was 
undisputed that Monsanto required all seed companies to place a notice 
on all bags of seeds stating that the seeds were “covered by U.S. Patents, 
that their purchase of the seeds convey[ed] no license, and that a license 
from Monsanto must be obtained before using the seeds.”181 However, 
unlike the McFarling case which focused on the grower’s patent-misuse 
defense, the Scruggs case also focused on first sale and implied-license 
defenses.182 
                                                     
176. Id. at 1341–42. 
177. Id. at 1342–43. 
178. Id. at 1343. 
179. Id. 
180. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
181. Id. at 1336. 
182. It appears that McFarling raised patent exhaustion as a defense in his answer, but the Federal 
Circuit did not address the issue in its opinion. Presumably, it was not argued in the district court or 
raised on appeal. See McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1340 (mentioning that McFarling raised patent 
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The Federal Circuit rejected Scruggs’ first sale defense.183 According 
to the court, patent exhaustion did not apply for two reasons. First, there 
was “no unrestricted sale” because the use of the seeds “was conditioned 
on obtaining a license from Monsanto.”184 Second, because: 
[T]he new seeds grown from the original batch had never been 
sold. Without the actual sale of the second generation of seed to 
Scruggs, there can be no patent exhaustion. The fact that a 
patented technology can replicate itself does not give a 
purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the technology. 
Applying the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations of 
self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of the 
patent holder.185 
Does the Scruggs decision break new ground on the law of patent 
exhaustion and first sale? Scruggs seems to line up well with the facts in 
General Talking Pictures. In General Talking Pictures, a patentee 
licensed an amplifier manufacturer to manufacture and sell amps for 
non-commercial uses.186 A commercial end user purchased the amps 
from the manufacturer “knowing that [the manufacturer] had not been 
licensed.”187 Under these facts, the Supreme Court ruled that “the 
restriction was legal and the amplifiers were made and sold outside the 
scope of the license.”188 According to the Court: 
[The effect of this for the end user was] precisely the same as if 
no license whatsoever had been granted to [the manufacturer]. 
And as the [end user] knew the facts, it is in no better position 
than if it had manufactured the amplifiers itself without a 
license. It is liable because it has used the invention without a 
license to do so.189 
Likewise, in Scruggs, a patentee licensed a seed manufacturer to 
manufacture and sell seeds for single crop usage.190 A commercial end-
                                                     
exhaustion and first sale as defenses in his answer). 
183. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335–36. The court also rejected Scruggs’ implied-license, misuse, and 
antitrust defenses. See id. at 1336, 1339–41. Judge Dyk dissented on the antitrust issue but not the 
first sale issue. See id. at 1342 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
184. Id. at 1336. 
185. Id. (internal markings omitted). 
186. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 125–26 (1938). 
187. Id. at 126. 
188. Id. at 127. 
189. Id. 
190. 459 F.3d at 1333. 
GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC 5/28/2009  10:46 AM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:199, 2009 
232 
user grower purchased the seeds from the manufacturer knowing that 
they were licensed only for a single crop. The Federal Circuit held that 
the license condition was legal (because it was within the scope of the 
patent) and that the grower’s use of seeds was outside the scope of the 
license.191 The Federal Circuit, like the Supreme Court in General 
Talking Pictures, ruled that the grower was therefore liable for patent 
infringement because the grower had used an invention without a valid 
license to do so (from either the manufacturer or Monsanto).192 
One interesting difference between the Scruggs and General Talking 
Pictures cases is the nature of the technology. In Scruggs, the 
technology was a seed that replicated itself—obviously the amps in 
General Talking Pictures did not present the possibility of self-
replication. This fact, however, did not change the law that the Federal 
Circuit applied. It simply presented a unique, modern, and challenging 
factual setting in which to apply the law. Indeed, because of the unique 
Monsanto technology involved, the grower who produced the new seed 
was, to some degree, a manufacturer as well as a user, so to this extent 
the soybean grower in the Scruggs case was more culpable193 (from a 
patent-infringement point of view)194 than the movie-theater operator in 
General Talking Pictures. 
3.  The Latest: Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 
i. The Federal Circuit’s Decision 
This history brings us to Quanta Computer—the Federal Circuit 
decision that caught the Supreme Court’s eye.195 Quanta Computer 
challenged the Federal Circuit to apply its first sale jurisprudence to a 
complex, modern business setting. The case illustrates one of the multi-
tiered licensing models that have emerged in the computer industry. 
Like many large computer-technology firms, LG Electronics has 
entered into patent portfolio cross licenses with other computer-
technology firms such as Intel, one of the parties in the case. Such cross 
                                                     
191. See id. at 1334–38. Unlike General Talking Pictures, however, the patentee did not sue the 
manufacturer. Id. at 1333 (patentee suing the grower). 
192. 459 F.3d at 1336. 
193. More culpable because the grower infringed both the “use” and the “make” rights. 
194. I recognize that some believe that there are higher moral imperatives at stake when it comes 
to reuse of seeds. 
195. The case was called LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc. at the circuit-court 
level. 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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licenses generally vary in scope. A given cross license may exclude 
certain technology or limit the ability of the licensee to use the cross 
license to shield its downstream customers or partners from patent 
claims. Often the scope of the license comes down to money. In the case 
of downstream shielding, the licensee must assess whether it makes 
business sense to pay on behalf of its customers in the cross license (and 
presumably pass on such cost in its purchase price) or let the customers 
pay for the patent rights on their own. These downstream customers and 
partners are a diverse bunch.196 They include software companies (e.g., 
Microsoft), personal computer sellers (e.g., Dell),197 companies that 
assemble computers, and end users. 
LG Electronics has patents that cover two different types of 
technology: microprocessors198 and computer systems.199 In its patent 
portfolio license with Intel, LG Electronics “granted Intel a license 
covering its entire portfolio of patents on computer systems and 
components.”200 Intel acquired the right to sell its microprocessors 
downstream under LG Electronics’ patents with one important 
exception: the license expressly disclaimed granting “a license allowing 
computer system manufacturers to combine Intel’s licensed parts with 
other non-Intel components.”201 
This exception is good news for computer-system manufacturers who 
have a patent portfolio cross license with LG Electronics. These 
companies already paid for the patent rights. They do not want to pay 
again as part of the price of Intel’s microprocessors. For those 
manufacturers who do not have such a license, however, Intel cannot 
serve as a “reseller” of LG Electronics’ patent rights. These 
manufacturers must purchase their patent rights directly from the 
patentee, LG Electronics.202 
                                                     
196. As described supra at Part I.A, many firms team up in the computer industry to create the 
product that we call a personal computer. 
197. The court in LG Electronics refers to computer sellers as “OEMs” which stands for “original 
equipment manufacturer.” 453 F.3d at 1371. The term “OEM” was created at a time when 
companies like Compaq and Digital Equipment Corp. actually assembled computers. As the 
computer industry has evolved, many of these OEMs have subcontracted or outsourced assembly to 
companies that do this work at a lower cost. Thus, the term “original equipment manufacturer” now 
is often a misnomer. 
198. A microprocessor is a component of a computer system. 
199. See LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1368, 1373. 
200. Id. at 1370. 
201. Id. 
202. Or, the manufacturer could acquire microprocessors from a company that has acquired the 
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The Federal Circuit applied the Mallinckrodt precedent to this 
complex licensing arrangement.203 In doing do, its ruling seems 
consistent with Mallinckrodt, Scruggs, and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in General Talking Pictures. LG Electronics had granted an 
expressly conditional license to Intel. LG Electronics required Intel to 
notify its customers of the condition and Intel did so. Thus, when Intel’s 
customers created computer systems that infringed LG Electronics’ 
patents, the customers were not shielded by Intel’s portfolio license with 
LG Electronics, and so they were infringing LG Electronics’ patents.204 
ii.  The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The U.S. Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court to review the 
Federal Circuit’s decision.205 The Solicitor General and several amici 
briefs argued that the Supreme Court should use the case to overturn 
Mallinckrodt and the entire line of Federal Circuit cases that rested upon 
it.206 The Supreme Court took the case and reversed the Federal Circuit 
in a unanimous decision, but did not overrule Mallinckrodt. 
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court first turned to 
the argument that the patent-exhaustion doctrine does not apply to 
patent-method claims. The Court rejected that argument: “Nothing in 
this Court’s approach to patent exhaustion supports LGE’s argument that 
method patents cannot be exhausted.”207 The Court observed that 
excluding method claims would create an incentive for clever attorneys 
to simply cast claims as method claims in hopes of avoiding the 
exhaustion doctrine. “We therefore reject LGE’s argument that method 
claims, as a category, are never exhaustible.”208 
The Court then addressed the issue of whether a product must 
embody a patent in order to trigger exhaustion. The Court observed that 
“the traditional bar on patent restrictions following the sale of an item 
                                                     
right from LG Electronics to shield the manufacturer’s downstream customers. 
203. LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370. 
204. “[T]his conditional agreement required Intel to notify its customers of the limited scope of 
the license, which it did.” Id. 
205. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 
553 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-937). 
206. See id. at 14–20; Brief Amicus Curiae of Consumers Union et al., at 2–4, 21, Quanta 
Computer, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109; Brief Amicus Curiae of Automotive Engine Rebuilders 
Ass’n et al., at 21–25, Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2109. 
207. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2117. 
208. Id. 
GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC 5/28/2009  10:46 AM 
Federal Circuit Licensing Law 
235 
applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—even if it does 
not completely practice the patent—such that its only and intended use is 
to be finished under the terms of the patent.”209 “Here, LGE has 
suggested no reasonable use for the Intel Products other than 
incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE 
Patents.”210 All that the computer assembler had to do to infringe the 
patent was to assemble the computer, following Intel’s specific 
instructions. Thus,  
[e]verything inventive about each patent is embodied in Intel 
Products. . . . Quanta was not required to make any creative or 
inventive decision when it added those parts. Indeed, Quanta 
had no alternative . . . because it did not know their internal 
structure, which Intel guards as a trade secret.211 
Finally, the Court considered whether Intel’s sale of chipsets to 
Quanta exhausted LG Electronics’ patents. The Court acknowledged, 
citing General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric,212 that exhaustion 
does not apply where a sale is unauthorized. Here the Court found that 
Intel’s sale was authorized, citing “the structure of the Intel-LGE 
transaction.”213 It pointed to language in the LGE–Intel license that 
granted Intel broad rights to make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer 
to sell, import or otherwise dispose of products, free from LG 
Electronics’ patent claims. The license agreement also purported not to 
“in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would 
otherwise apply.”214 The Court acknowledged that the parties had 
agreed, in a separate license, that Intel would give notice to Intel’s 
customers that they were not licensed to practice LG Electronics patents 
in Intel/non-Intel combinations (and had given that notice to Quanta), 
but it found that “Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the 
LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision 
to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.”215 If anything, the Court 
indicated, LG Electronics might have a claim for breach of contract. But 
LG Electronics did not plead such claim, so the Court did not address 
                                                     
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 2119. 
211. Id. at 2120. 
212. 304 U.S. 175 (1938). 
213. Quanta, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2121. 
214. Id. at 2114. 
215. Id. at 2122. 
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that issue.216 
At one level, the Quanta Computer case seems like all the other 
recent patent-related challenges to and reversals of the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court.217 The Supreme Court emphatically 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s notion that patent-method claims can never 
be exhausted and clarified the extent to which a product must embody a 
patent to trigger a first sale.218 On closer inspection, however, the 
Supreme Court’s reversal in Quanta Computer really amounts to an 
affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s basic approach to patent exhaustion 
in the Mallinckrodt line of cases. 
The fundamental issue from a first sale standpoint was whether LG 
Electronics’ license had authorized Intel’s sales to PC assemblers (such 
as Quanta). As explained by the Court: “Exhaustion is triggered only by 
a sale authorized by the patent holder.”219 The Court found that, indeed, 
LG Electronics’ license had authorized Intel’s sales “because the license 
authorizes the sale of components that substantially embody the patents 
in suit, the sale exhausted the patents.”220 
LG Electronics argued that the license had placed conditions on 
Intel’s right to sell. If it had, then Intel’s sale to Quanta might not have 
been authorized. However, the Supreme Court found no persuasive 
evidence of binding conditions: “No conditions limited Intel’s authority 
to sell products substantially embodying the patents.”221 
Notably, the Supreme Court did not overrule Mallinckrodt even 
though it was strongly urged to do so by the U.S. Solicitor General and 
others. It did not criticize (or even mention) the Federal Circuit’s first 
sale jurisprudence that flows from Mallinckrodt. It did not overrule (or 
even question) its General Talking Pictures precedent on which 
Mallinckrodt is based—the Court pointed out that unlike the license at 
                                                     
216. See id. at 2122 n.7. 
217. See generally Greg A. McAllister, Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics: The Supreme Court 
Applies Its Patent Exhaustion Precedent and Rejects Recent Federal Circuit Modifications to the 
Doctrine, CASRIP NEWSL. (Ctr. for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop., Seattle, 
Wash. ) ,  Summer 2008,  h t tp : / /www.law.washington.edu/casr ip /newsle t ter /vol15/ 
newsv15i2QuantaLG.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev199n217.pdf. 
218. Quanta, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2117–21. 
219. Id. at 2121 (emphasis added). 
220. Id. at 2113. “Intel’s authorized sale to Quanta thus took its products outside the scope of the 
patent monopoly, and as a result, LGE can no longer assert its patent rights against Quanta.” Id. at 
2122. 
221. Id. at 2122. 
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issue in General Talking Pictures, LG Electronics’ license did not place 
conditions on Intel’s sales.222 The Supreme Court’s basis for reversal 
came down to something quite simple: the Federal Circuit found, in its 
reading of the license agreements, conditions on Intel’s ability to sell; 
and the Supreme Court, in its reading, did not. This decision is not the 
grand, course-altering ruling that many had asked for. Instead, by its 
approach, the Quanta Computer decision quietly affirmed Mallinckrodt 
and its progeny.223 
The fundamental teaching of Mallinckrodt (drawing on earlier 
Supreme Court precedent) is that an intellectual property holder may 
place conditions on a license or sale. That remains the law after Quanta 
Computer.224 Justice Thomas’ opinion for the Court spent considerable 
time examining the details of the LG–Intel transactions to see if any 
conditions existed.225 This made sense because the presence or absence 
of license conditions makes all the difference in whether a downstream 
sale is authorized or not. Finding no conditions, it was easy for the Court 
to rule that the license authorized Intel’s sale, and it therefore exhausted 
LG Electronics’ patents. 
C.  Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s First Sale Jurisprudence: 
Comparison to Other United States Circuit Courts 
This section compares the Federal Circuit’s first sale jurisprudence 
with the jurisprudence of other courts, particularly other federal circuit 
courts. This analysis includes copyright first sale cases as well as patent-
exhaustion cases. Copyrights and patents are very different types of 
                                                     
222. See id. 
223. But see McAllister, supra note 217, at Part I (“The case overturns the Federal Circuit’s 
patent exhaustion jurisprudence, under which patent rights were exhausted only by unconditional 
sales . . . .”). Mr. McAllister’s conclusion does not seem supported by the Court’s reasoning in 
Quanta Computer. Justice Thomas’s opinion did not announce a new “rule” about first sale, and he 
did not renounce the Federal Circuit’s approach. Instead, the Supreme Court paid special attention 
to whether the parties had placed conditions on Intel’s sales (and ultimately found that they had not, 
at least none that were binding). Moreover, as to the characterization that Quanta Computer creates 
a new “rule,” the Supreme Court has been particularly averse to establishing rigid rules in patent-
related cases. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by 
rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.”); see also eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
224. See Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta, Post-Sale Patentee Controls, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 682, 694–95 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court overruled B. Braun sub 
silentio but did not overrule Mallinckrodt). 
225. Quanta, 533 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2121–22. 
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intellectual property to be sure, and there may be occasions when their 
differences justify different treatment of the use of contracts to 
commercialize intellectual property.226 However, the first sale doctrines 
are closely related and raise many of the same policy issues. Courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have on many occasions drawn on 
precedents from one type of intellectual property to decide cases in the 
other.227 
1.  Patent Exhaustion 
The Federal Circuit has decided most of the patent-exhaustion cases, 
but the Ninth Circuit recently examined a post-sale restriction on printer 
cartridges in Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark 
International Inc.228 The procedural posture of this case was atypical,229 
but the court ruled directly that Lexmark could, as a matter of law, 
enforce a post-sale restriction on reuse of printer cartridges. Applying 
California contract law230 the court held: 
[T]he contract on its face appears to be enforceable based on the 
district court’s findings that consumers (1) have notice of the 
condition, (2) have a chance to reject the contract on that basis, 
and (3) receive consideration in the form of a reduced price in 
exchange for the limits placed on the reuse of the cartridge.231 
                                                     
226. See Patterson, supra note 112, at 160–61. 
227. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (using 
patent law’s staple article in commerce doctrine to decide copyright contributory infringement 
case); see also cases cited supra, note 99. 
228. 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005). 
229. The enforceability of the contract was raised in the context of a consumer-protection 
violation: the plaintiff alleged that Lexmark’s assertion that it could enforce a post-sale restriction 
was wrong as a matter of law, and was therefore an unfair and deceptive practice. Id. at 985. To 
resolve the consumer-protection issue, the Ninth Circuit had to decide the issue of contract 
enforceability. Id. at 986–88. 
230. The district court had relied extensively on Mallinckrodt, but the Ninth Circuit went back to 
first principles and relied on California contract law. See id. at 986–88. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation urged the Ninth Circuit to use the Arizona Cartridge case as a vehicle to reject the 
Mallinckrodt case, but the court did not take the bait, saying that the plaintiff did not raise the 
argument on appeal and had conceded in its brief that “the otherwise unfettered use of a patented 
good can be constrained.” Id. at 987. 
231. Id. at 988. Unlike many other patent first sale cases, the court did not need to examine 
whether Lexmark was acting beyond the scope of its patent. The plaintiff had not raised the 
argument on appeal and had conceded in its brief that “the otherwise unfettered use of a patented 
good can be constrained.” Id. at 987. 
GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC 5/28/2009  10:46 AM 
Federal Circuit Licensing Law 
239 
2.  Copyright First Sale 
Many of the early copyright-related cases challenging post-sale 
conditions on use232 came out of the software industry. In these cases, 
the software user challenged conditions on use of the software,233 
arguing that he or she had acquired the software as a first sale under the 
Copyright Act and, as such, the license conditions were preempted by 
Section 301 of the Copyright Act and could be ignored.234 One of the 
first cases to address the issue of potential Copyright Act preemption235 
of software end-user licenses was National Car Rental System, Inc. v. 
Computer Associates International, Inc.236 In National Car Rental, the 
                                                     
232. Conditions on “use” must be analyzed differently in the context of licenses of various types 
of intellectual property. In patent law, the right to control “use” is one of the exclusive rights of the 
patent holder. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (discussing patentee’s right to exclude others from 
making, using, or offering the patented invention for sale). In trademark and trade secret licensing, 
setting parameters on use of a trademark or trade secret is the very essence of the license grant. In 
copyright law, the right to control “use” is not one of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder 
(copyrights include the exclusive right to copy, distribute, create derivative works, and publicly 
perform or display under 17 U.S.C. § 106). However, in a copyright license, a license grant 
describing permissible uses sometimes implicates one of the exclusive rights, such as the right to 
copy or create derivative works. Other times, however, a grant controlling “use” means simply that. 
In the latter case, if the licensee’s use exceeds the scope of use granted, then the cause of action is 
for breach of contract rather than a copyright infringement. See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. 
Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 427 (8th Cir. 1993) (addressing a state-law breach-of-
contract claim alleging that the licensee of computer software exceeded limitations on the use of 
computer software contained in the license agreements). 
233. Many cases were also decided on contract-formation grounds. Courts across circuits and 
state courts have applied modern contract-formation rules, finding an enforceable contract in some 
cases but not others. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); M.A. Mortenson 
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000). 
234. The Copyright Act provides the exclusive source of protection for “all legal and equitable 
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights” granted by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 
301(a) (2006). The Copyright Act’s Section 301 expressly preempts any state law that attempts to 
provide equivalent rights. Conversely, of course, the Copyright Act does not prevent state law from 
enforcing non-equivalent legal or equitable rights. 
235. A classic state-statute preemption case in the area of end user licensing was Vault Corp. v. 
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the 
Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, which permitted software publishers to enforce terms 
against end users provided that the terms were in a license comporting with the statute. According to 
the statute, enforceable terms “include the prohibition of: (1) any copying of the program for any 
purpose; and (2) modifying and/or adapting the program in any way, including adaptation by 
reverse engineering, decompiliation or disassembly.” Id. at 268–69. The Fifth Circuit held that the 
Louisiana statute conflicted with the rights of computer-program owners conferred in Section 117 of 
the Copyright Act, which permits the owner of a copy to make certain adaptations that are essential 
steps in the utilization of the program and to make archival copies. Id. at 270. 
236. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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Eight Circuit held that the Copyright Act did not preempt a contractual 
limitation on the licensee’s ability to use the software in certain ways.237 
Other courts have agreed with respect to contractual constraints on 
copyrighted works, including courts from the Fourth,238 Fifth,239 Sixth,240 
and Seventh Circuits.241 
Most famously, in ProCD v. Zeidenberg,242 the Seventh Circuit held 
that enforcement of a shrinkwrap license for ProCD’s software and 
database product was not preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright 
Act.243 In that case, Mr. Zeidenberg acquired a version of ProCD’s 
software and database product that was licensed solely for internal 
private use.244 If a user wanted to use ProCD’s product for commercial 
purposes, it could obtain such a license for a higher fee. Mr. Zeidenberg 
ignored the limited license grant by hosting the database on the Internet 
for public use and access.245 The Seventh Circuit ruled that Mr. 
Zeidenberg had seen the license, assented to it, and was therefore bound 
by it.246 
The court in ProCD ruled that, generally speaking,247 claims for 
breach of a license contract are not equivalent to claims of copyright 
infringement.248 The court reasoned that: “A copyright is a right against 
                                                     
237. Id. at 433. 
238. See Acorn Structures Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988). 
239. See Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990). 
240. See Wrench, L.L.C. v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001). 
241. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). In addition, intuiting 
First Circuit law, the Federal Circuit in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. held that a “no 
reverse engineering” clause in a shrinkwrap license was not preempted by the Copyright Act. 320 
F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
242. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
243. Id. at 1455. 
244. Id. at 1449. 
245. The end user in the ProCD case was notified of the license condition on four separate 
occasions (on the product packaging, in the user guide, upon installation of the software, and prior 
to gaining access to the product’s data). The end user’s explanation for violating the condition was 
not that he did not know about it, but that he thought it was unenforceable (i.e., essentially a legal 
conclusion). See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 651 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (“In 
defendant’s view, the contract for the sale of SelectPhone was completed at the time of sale and the 
license represents additional terms to which they cannot be bound . . . .”). 
246. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452–53. 
247. The court cautioned that it is “prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with the 
label ‘contract’ is necessarily outside the preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too 
numerous to foresee.” 86 F.3d at 1455. 
248. See Daniel Laster, The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market License Terms 
Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 621 (2006) 
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the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; 
strangers may do as they please,249 so contracts do not create ‘exclusive 
rights.’”250 In other words, a license is not equivalent to a copyright 
because a license allots rights only between specific parties bound by a 
contractual relationship and does not represent a general right to exclude 
all parties, as a copyright does.251 While academic commentators love to 
hate the ProCD case,252 most courts have followed its approach.253 
For example, in Blizzard Entertainment Inc. v. Jung,254 the Eighth 
Circuit rejected a conflict-preemption claim relating to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA).255 The case addressed whether a 
“no reverse engineering clause” in a mass-market license is preempted 
by Section 1201(f) of the DMCA, which provides an interoperability 
exception to the Act’s prohibition on circumventing copyright protection 
devices.256 The users of Blizzard Entertainment’s software had agreed to 
either a boot-screen license or an online “terms of use” license. Both 
licenses prohibited the act of reverse engineering the software.257 The 
users nonetheless reverse engineered Blizzard Entertainment’s software 
games to discover protocols so that they could create a gaming website 
                                                     
(arguing that patent law, rather than copyright law, should be the proper focus of preemption 
analysis in cases of reverse engineering). 
249. Some commentators argue that mass-market licenses, in reality, create something more like 
an in rem right. See, e.g., id. at 674–77. 
250. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454. 
251. Some courts use the term “extra element” to explain the point about non-equivalency 
between contract rights and copyrights. They note that a breach-of-contract claim has an extra 
element that a copyright-infringement claim does not, namely proof of contractual relationship. The 
need to prove the existence of this relationship in a breach-of-contract case makes a contract claim 
different from a copyright claim. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 
(10th Cir. 1993) (trade-secret claim not preempted by copyright claim); Baltimore Orioles v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). 
252. See Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious, supra note 33, at 687 (noting that in the past twenty 
years over one hundred scholarly articles have been written on the subject of mass-market software 
licenses, most of them critical, and many of them criticizing the ProCD decision on various 
grounds). For a recent example, see Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? 
Contracting Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93 
(2006). 
253. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10 at 538; LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 
337 (3d ed. 2006) (“Since ProCD, a majority of courts have enforced shrinkwrap licenses.”). 
254. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
255. Id. at 640–41. 
256. Id. at 637. 
257. Id. at 635–36. 
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that worked with the games.258 Blizzard Entertainment sued for breach 
of contract. The Eighth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs had contractually 
accepted restrictions on their ability to reverse engineer Blizzard 
Entertainment’s software and that the bargain was permissible under 
copyright law.259 The court held that enforcement of the contract does 
not conflict with the interoperability exception in the DMCA.260 
The Ninth Circuit recently summed up the state of play for challenges 
related to first sale in software cases: 
Generally, if the copyright holder makes it clear that she or he is 
granting only a license to the copy of software and imposes 
significant restrictions on the purchaser’s ability to redistribute 
or transfer that copy, the purchaser is considered a licensee, not 
an owner, of the software. . . . Indeed, the first sale doctrine 
rarely applies in the software world because software is rarely 
“sold.”261 
VI.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STEWARDSHIP OF LICENSING 
LAW 
A.  Upholding the Use of Licenses in Technological and Business-
Model Innovation 
This Article began by describing how licenses play a vital role in the 
information economy. Licenses underlie the creation and distribution of 
ideas, information, inventions, and works. People use licenses to build 
products and create customer solutions; they use them to distribute 
products and enable use.262 Licenses lie at the center of both 
technological and business-model innovation. Both types of innovation 
are critical to success in the information economy. 
The Federal Circuit is well positioned to observe the use of licenses in 
the information economy because cases involving ideas and inventions 
                                                     
258. Id. at 637. 
259. Id. at 638. 
260. One recent commentator disagrees with this outcome. See Laster, supra note 248, at 693–
701. 
261. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 785, 785 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006). 
262. Although much of the discussion supra focuses on information technology, licensing is also 
important in other areas of the economy. See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control 
Commercialization of Stem Cell Diagnostics and Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 
(2006). 
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make up the court’s standard diet.263 For example, the court recently 
decided an important case addressing licensing of open source 
software.264 The Federal Circuit sees not only innovative technology, but 
also the innovative ways that people assemble and distribute that 
technology. In other words, the court is a technology expert and a 
technology-business expert. This expertise has broadened as patent cases 
now involve a wide range of inventions such as software and business 
methods.265 Moreover, innovation-related cases today involve more than 
only patents;266 it is now common for the court, in the same case, to see 
the application of copyright,267 trademark, trade secret, contract, and 
patent law to various aspects of a product and the strategy to take that 
product to market.268 
The Federal Circuit’s expertise in technology businesses brings an 
important perspective to licensing cases. A court needs to appreciate the 
ramifications that its decisions will have on business-model innovation. 
Without this sensitivity, a court can unduly disrupt efficient business 
                                                     
263. In addition to the cases described supra, as the court that reviews government-contract 
appeals, the Federal Circuit sees many cases involving intellectual property, software, and 
information licenses between firms and the United States government. See, e.g., Campbell Plastics, 
Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 757–
868 (describing licensing in the government-contracts setting); Danielle Conway-Jones, Research 
and Development Deliverables Under Government Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Development 
Agreements and CRADAs, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 181 (2004). 
264. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see generally Gomulkiewicz, supra note 
41. 
265. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. BarnesAndNoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
266. The Federal Circuit is often perceived as an expert in all types of intellectual property, not 
just patents. See Lawrence Rosen, Bad Facts Make Good Law: The Jacobsen Case and Open 
Source, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 1, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n266.pdf (“The Jacobsen case found its 
way to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), arguably the most important court 
short of the U.S. Supreme Court for intellectual property matters.” (emphasis added)). 
267. Arguably some of the most important contemporary copyright cases and issues deal with the 
distribution of copyright works rather than the creative process. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning 
Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2003). In terms of cases, see, for 
example, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). In terms of issues, the Google 
Books Library Project is a good example. See Google Book Search Library Project, 
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n267.pdf. 
268. See e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (copyrights, 
contracts, patents); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (contracts, trade 
secrets, patents); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(copyrights and patents). 
GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC 5/28/2009  10:46 AM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:199, 2009 
244 
practices269 and, in some cases, threaten the viability of certain 
industries.270 Lack of licensing-law expertise may also mean that a court 
will fail to appreciate the implications that a ruling in an area of law may 
have on the business practices of innovators.271 The Federal Circuit 
understands that licensing is just as important to MySQL272 as it is to 
Monsanto.273 
The Federal Circuit’s general approach to cases involving complex, 
modern licensing models is to leave them intact.274 This approach began 
in Mallinckrodt and continued through the Monsanto cases and on to LG 
Electronics. 
That is not to say that the Federal Circuit is an uncritical judge of 
licensing. The court does not seem willing to tolerate shoddy contracting 
practices.275 Additionally, it has been careful to assure that a license 
                                                     
269. See Colloquy, Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream Licensing Restrictions, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025, 1040 (2006) (quoting Dick Ulmer, counsel in 
Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturing Ass’n v. Lexmark International, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 
2005), speaking about Lexmark: “Lexmark was very careful in structuring this program. They very 
closely followed the Mallinckrodt case, which was of great interest to them. The other key case in 
this field, although it is not a patent case, is the ProCD case, which, to our mind, is the key case.”); 
Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33. 
270. See Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Contract and Contracts Are Not at War, 87 CAL. L. REV. 79 
(1999) (explaining how the information industry relies on licenses in light of Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. World Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), a case which makes more difficult to 
claim a copyright in a database). 
271. See O’Connor, supra note 109 (pointing out that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), had significant negative unintended 
consequences for the university technology-transfer community’s licensing practices). 
272. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source Hackers—MySQL and Its 
Dual Licensing, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 203 (2004); see also Progress Software Corp. v. 
MySQL AB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); see generally Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing 
Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); Jason B. 
Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451 
(2005); Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability 
of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2000); WEBER, supra note 26, at 
190–223. 
273. Monsanto has not always been on the winning side. See Rhone Poulnec Agro S.A. v. 
DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (rejecting bona-fide-purchaser defense 
raised by Monsanto). 
274. See generally U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(patent package licensing); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(copier equipment and maintenance policy); Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (end-user software license); discussion of the Mallinckrodt, Monsanto, and LG 
Electronics cases, supra Part V.B. 
275. See Hewlett Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (re-use of printer ink cartridges); Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (single-use cameras); cf. Campbell Plastics Eng’g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 
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grant is within with scope of the patent rights.276 The court recognizes 
that business practices that expand the scope of a patent or become part 
of an anticompetitive practice are out of bounds.277 When litigants raise 
challenges of this nature, however, the Federal Circuit seems to take 
great care to examine the business context. 
A good example is the court’s decision in U.S. Philips Corp. v. 
International Trade Commission.278 In that case, a licensee argued that 
U.S. Philips’ package patent-licensing arrangement for recordable and 
rewritable CDs constituted patent misuse because both essential and 
non-essential patents were licensed for one price in one non-divisible 
package. The Federal Circuit performed a detailed analysis of the 
licensing practice as it related to the market and finally upheld U.S. 
Philips’ business model “[i]n light of the efficiencies of package patent 
licensing.”279 In reaching its conclusion the court analogized Philips’ 
patent package licensing to the package copyright-licensing scheme that 
the Supreme Court approved in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc.280 
One of the most telling examples of the Federal Circuit’s approach to 
modern licensing practice can be found in Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies, Inc.281 In that case, a developer of computer aided design 
(CAD) software attempted to enforce a prohibition on reverse 
engineering embodied in a shrinkwrap license. The licensee, like many 
licensees before it, argued that the license was preempted under Section 
301 of the Copyright Act. The Federal Circuit, citing several prior circuit 
court decisions, turned aside this challenge. 
The more difficult question, however, was whether the licensee’s 
conduct was permitted as a “fair use” under the Copyright Act. This 
question presented a direct collision between freedom of contract and a 
                                                     
F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (government-contract licensing case). 
276. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
277. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
278. 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (intuiting the Tenth Circuit’s approach, the Federal Circuit refused to impose 
antitrust liability for unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 
195 F.23d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (vacating preliminary-injunction remedy of mandatory disclosure 
of trade secrets and other provision of intellectual property). 
279. U.S. Philips, 424 F.3d at 1193. 
280. 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (discussing the efficiencies of ASCAP and BMI public-performance 
copyright licensing and ruling the licensing scheme was not a per se violation of antitrust law). 
281. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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statutory defense to copyright infringement.282 Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit had previously stated that reverse engineering software might be 
a fair use under the Copyright Act.283 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit 
concluded:  
[P]rivate parties are free to contractually forego the limited 
ability to reverse engineer a software product under the 
exemptions of the Copyright Act. Of course, a party bound by 
such a contract may elect to efficiently breach the agreement in 
order to ascertain ideas in a computer program unprotected by 
copyright law. Under such circumstances, the breaching party 
must weigh the benefits of breach against the arguably de 
minimis damages arising from merely discerning non-protected 
code.284 
In other words, the Federal Circuit is willing to let technology 
businesses innovate in their business models as well as with their 
technology. Some licensing practices may rise to the level of misuse, 
violate antitrust laws, or be unenforceable because of faulty contract 
formation. Outside of that, the Federal Circuit has carefully stewarded 
modern licensing practices against judicial interference. 
Some might wonder whether the Federal Circuit has demonstrated a 
“pro licensor” bias in its jurisprudence in the same way that many have 
alleged that the court has a “pro patentee” bias.285 It is important to note 
that many scholars now believe that concerns over a pro-patentee bias 
“have largely abated.”286 Some scholars who have studied the Federal 
Circuit’s first sale jurisprudence seem to think that it favors patent 
licensors.287 By and large, however, courts at all levels and in all 
jurisdictions seem to favor licensors in the majority of cases.288 There is 
nothing in my reading of the Federal Circuit’s case law to indicate that 
the Federal Circuit favors licensors more than any other federal or state 
                                                     
282. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 38–39. 
283. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
284. Id. at 1325–26. 
285. See Janicke & Ren, supra note 14, at 38 (“The Federal Circuit has often been accused of 
having a pro-patent leaning.”). 
286. Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 770; see also Janicke & Ren, supra note 14, at 38 (“There is 
nothing in our findings that would support [a pro-patent leaning] view.”). 
287. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 112. 
288. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60, (2006) (“Every court to 
consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . enforceable. A majority of courts in the past 
ten years have enforced shrinkwrap licenses . . . Finally, and more recently, an increasing number of 
courts have enforced ‘browsewrap’ licenses . . . .”). 
GOMULKIEWICZ 5-28-09.DOC 5/28/2009  10:46 AM 
Federal Circuit Licensing Law 
247 
court.289 However, further study may reveal (or put to rest) such a 
concern.290 Most significantly, the stereotypical picture of a large, 
powerful licensor and a small, weak licensee does not reflect the 
complex realities of the information economy in which licensors and 
licensees come in all shapes and sizes,291 as illustrated so well by open 
source software licensing.292 
The Federal Circuit’s approach to modern licensing generally lines up 
well with the approach of other courts, especially other federal circuit 
courts. Litigants and commentators have challenged modern licensing 
practices on first sale,293 preemption,294 misuse,295 antitrust,296 and fair-
use297 grounds. As previously discussed, by and large, courts have turned 
                                                     
289. Compare, e.g., Hewlett Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) with Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (closely 
examining contract formation in both cases). See also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware 
Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (ruling for the licensee over Judge 
Radar’s dissent, and carefully construing a license for software repair and maintenance while 
tackling several challenging license-interpretation issues, including the intersection between the 
license and 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000)). 
290. Cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse For Buyers? 
Evidence From Software License Agreements, LAW & ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES 
NO. 05-10 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 7, 2005, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev199n290.pdf (finding that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the substantive terms of “pay now, terms later” licenses are actually better in 
most cases than terms where assent is manifest in advance of payment); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice 
Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111 (2008) 
(challenging conventional wisdom that the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Texas should be 
considered a notorious haven for patent litigation). 
291. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 33. 
292. For a recent example, see Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which 
involves a dispute over interpretation of the Artistic License used with open source software used by 
model railroad enthusiasts. 
293. See, e.g., John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale 
Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004). 
294. See, e.g., Dennis J. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. 
DAYTON. L. REV. 511 (1997); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright 
and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995). 
295. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 
2003); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); Va. Panel 
Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing threat to void warranty not 
patent misuse). 
296. See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
297. See, e.g., Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003). In the Federal Circuit, see Bowers v. Baystate 
Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and DSC Communication Corp. v. Pulse 
Communication, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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aside these challenges, refusing to meddle in the market.298 Even the 
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies decision, which arguably presents one 
of the most challenging intersections between contract and intellectual-
property law,299 is in the mainstream300 and has been directly 
followed.301 
The Federal Circuit’s approach also seems to line up well with the 
Supreme Court’s approach.302 As a general proposition, the Supreme 
Court has upheld freedom of contract and modern contracting 
practices.303 The Supreme Court has not tolerated attempts to extend 
                                                     
298. In addition to the Specht, Arizona Cartridge, Blizzard Entertainment, National Car Rental, 
and ProCD cases discussed supra Part V.C, there are several other pertinent cases. See, e.g., Micro 
Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 
216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002); i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 
782 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); 
I-A Equip. Co. v. I-Code, Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 807 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000); M.A. 
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000). While 
upholding modern licensing practices as a general rule, courts have not enforced all licenses or 
license terms, particularly where the licensor did not provide a meaningful opportunity to review the 
terms or there was no meaningful manifestation of assent, or where a term was unconscionable or 
violated antitrust law or constituted a misuse of intellectual property. The Specht and Arizona Retail 
cases, for example, approved of some license transactions but found others to be unenforceable 
because of shoddy contracting practices. The courts in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 
F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), Acatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999), 
and Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, L.L.C. v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003) 
refused to enforce the copyright because certain provisions in software licenses amounted to a 
“misuse” of the copyright. In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the 
court held that provisions in Microsoft’s OEM licenses were used to illegally maintain its Windows 
software monopoly. Several courts have refused to enforce mandatory arbitration, choice-of-law or 
venue provisions in consumer licenses, finding them unconscionable. See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding mandatory arbitration provision 
unconscionable); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 
218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
299. In Bowers, the court considered whether a contractual limitation on reverse engineering 
should be enforceable. This pits the notions of freedom and certainty of contract against the notion 
of a copyright being a limited exclusive right. See David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: 
Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 595 (2004) (criticizing the 
Bowers v. Baystate decision). 
300. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
301. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
302. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 29 (“Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s own patent 
jurisprudence is mostly quite old, limiting its value as a guide to the most pressing unresolved issues 
of today.”) 
303. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 586 (1991); Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see generally 1 E.A. FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS 4.26–4.27 (1990); Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) 
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patent or copyright monopolies,304 but in intellectual-property licensing, 
the Supreme Court has upheld a license against a challenge that the 
license was preempted by federal patent law305 and recognized the 
importance of trade-secret licensing to the dissemination of 
knowledge.306 One could also read the Supreme Court’s rather narrow 
decision in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.307 as encouraging 
innovative business practices except when the practices strongly 
encourage infringing activities. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent 
approach in technology-related antitrust cases seems to favor giving 
breathing space to evolving business practices.308 
B.  Future Licensing-Law Cases 
The Federal Circuit’s strong influence over the shape of licensing law 
should remind the court to take special care in its licensing cases, 
acknowledging the broad impact of its rulings. Thus far, the Federal 
Circuit has been adept, as discussed, at being a good steward of licensing 
practices that promote technological and business-model innovation. 
Providing an analysis of whether and how its rules in patent-licensing 
                                                     
(“Ours is not a bazaar economy in which the terms of every transaction, or even of most 
transactions, are individually dickered; even when they are, standard clauses are commonly 
incorporated into the final contract, without separate negotiation of each of them.”). 
304. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (attempted 
use of trade dress after patent had expired); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 
U.S. 23 (2003) (attempted use of Lanham Act to extend copyright protection). 
305. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979). But see Lear, Inc. v. 
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (declining to enforce licensee estoppel term). 
306. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974) (“Another problem that 
would arise if state trade secret protection were precluded is in this area of licensing others to 
exploit secret processes. The holder of the trade secret would not likely share his secret with a 
manufacturer who cannot be placed under binding legal obligation to pay a license fee or to protect 
the secret. The result would be to hoard rather than to disseminate knowledge.”). 
307. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Many believed that the Supreme Court would use the Grokster case to 
update its jurisprudence on secondary liability for copyright infringement. The Court, however, 
declined to do so and instead based its ruling on the evidence before it, which showed pervasive 
inducement to infringe. 545 U.S. at 934–40. This, in effect, allowed a variety of file-sharing 
business models to survive so long as the proprietors did not promote themselves in the manner that 
the defendants had in Grokster. 
308. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (ruling that one 
cannot presume a patent confers market power, leaving in place a business practice whereby OEMs 
are required to buy both unpatented and patented ink cartridges); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (refusing to find that an alleged 
violation of 1996 Telecommunications Act states a claim for a “refusal to deal” under the Sherman 
Act). 
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cases should apply to copyright, trademark, trade secret, and information 
licensing would be a useful guide for other courts that often apply 
Federal Circuit patent-licensing cases by analogy. Special care should be 
taken, as it was in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil 
Manufacturing Corp.,309 when it comes to applying basic contract-law 
principles to licensing practices.310 It appears that the downfall of the 
Federal Circuit in Quanta Computer may have been its eagerness to find 
binding contract terms (and binding contractual conditions), which were 
not warranted by the facts. And finally, as the Supreme Court did in 
Univis Lens (a case re-affirmed in Quanta Computer), the Federal 
Circuit should be ready to strike down licensing practices that violate 
licensing-law boundaries such as misuse, antitrust, and unconscionable 
terms. Such an approach would ensure good stewardship of the balance 
between exclusive rights and public uses, which is fundamental in our 
intellectual-property laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has become one of the 
most influential actors in the creation of licensing law. Licensing law has 
developed as common law in the aftermath of failed efforts to codify it. 
In this setting, state and federal courts now look to the Federal Circuit 
for guidance when deciding licensing-related cases. The Federal 
Circuit’s influence reaches across industries, regions, and types of 
intellectual property. The court’s approach to licensing law has been 
simple but powerful: let modern licensing practices flourish, hemmed in 
only when such practices run afoul of misuse, antitrust, or contract-
formation issues. Given the importance of licensing in the information 
economy to the development and distribution of products as diverse as 
open source software and soybean seed, the wisdom of this approach 
will play an important role in the United States’ ability to innovate and 
compete in the world economy. 
                                                     
309. 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
310. For one critique, see Kaiser, supra note 11. 
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APPENDIX I: COURTS CITING FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES 
Issue Case Court Type 
Copyright: 
choice of law 
Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino 
270 F.3d 821 
C.A.9 (Cal.), 2001 
C.A.9 (Cal.) Circuit 
Copyright: 
misuse / antitrust 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 
239 F.3d 1004 
C.A.9 (Cal.), 2001 
C.A.9 (Cal.) Circuit 
Copyright/software: 
reverse engineering 
Micro Data Base Systems, Inc. v. Dharma 
Systems, Inc. 
148 F.3d 649 
C.A.7 (Ind.), 1998 
C.A.7 (Ind.) Circuit 
Patents: 
choice of law 
In re CFLC, Inc. 
89 F.3d 673 
C.A.9 (Cal.), 1996 
C.A.9 (Cal.) Circuit 
Patents: 
choice of law 
Boggild v. Kenner Products, Div. of CPG 
Products Corp. 
853 F.2d 465 
C.A.6 (Ohio), 1988 
C.A.6 (Ohio) Circuit 
Patents: 
choice of law 
Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp. 
173 F. Supp. 2d 201 
D. Del., 2001 
D. Del District 
Trademark:  
assignment / license-
back as evidence of 
confusion 
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co. 
955 F.2d 1327 
C.A.9 (Cal.), 1992 
C.A.9 (Cal.) Circuit 
Patents: 
infringement 
damages in terms of 
value of a license 
University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. 
v. American Cyanamid Co. 
216 F. Supp. 2d 1188 
D. Colo., 2002 
D. Colo. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Cook Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp. 
208 F. Supp. 2d 874 
N.D. Ill., 2002 
N.D. Ill. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Monsanto Co. v. Trantham 
156 F. Supp. 2d 855 
W.D. Tenn., 2001 
W.D. Tenn. District 
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Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Soundview 
Technologies, Inc. 
157 F. Supp. 2d 172 
D. Conn., 2001 
D. Conn., 
2001. 
District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
In re Singer Co., N.V. 
262 B.R. 257 
Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y., 2001 
Bkrtcy. 
S.D.N.Y. 
District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Travelers Exp. Co., Inc. v. American Exp. 
Integrated Payment 
80 F. Supp. 2d 1033 
D. Minn., 1999 
D. Minn. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc. 
5 F. Supp. 2d 1201 
D. Kan., 1998 
D. Kan. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Cardiovascular Diagnostics Inc. v. 
Boehringer Mannheim Corp. 
985 F. Supp. 615 
E.D.N.C., 1997 
E.D.N.C. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Empire Iron Works, Inc. v. Defender, Inc. 
992 F. Supp. 928 
E.D. Mich., 1997 
E.D. Mich. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Glass Equipment Development, Inc. v. 
Simonton Windows Co. 
929 F. Supp. 227 
N.D. W. Va., 1996 
N.D. W. Va. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Hoppe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 
878 F. Supp. 303 
D. Mass., 1995 
D. Mass. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Lifescan, Inc. v. Can-Am Care Corp. 
859 F. Supp. 392 
N.D. Cal., 1994 
N.D. Cal. District 
Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Universal Electronics, Inc. v. Zenith 
Electronics Corp. 
846 F. Supp. 641 
N.D. Ill. 1994 
N.D. Ill. District 
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Patents: 
implied license / 
exhaustion 
Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp. 
803 F. Supp. 1200 
E.D. Tex. 1992 
E.D. Tex. District 
General: 
contract interpretation 
In re Valley Media, Inc. 
279 B.R. 105 
Bkrtcy. D. Del., 2002 
Bkrtcy. D. 
Del. 
District 
Patents:  
contract interpretation 
Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp. 
173 F. Supp. 2d 201 
D. Del., 2001 
D. Del. District 
Patents:  
contract interpretation 
In re Supernatural Foods, LLC 
268 B.R. 759 
Bkrtcy. M.D. La., 2001 
Bkrtcy. M.D. 
La. 
District 
Patents:  
contract interpretation 
Syndia Corp. v. Lemelson Medical 
Education and Research Foundation, 
165 F. Supp. 2d 728 
N.D. Ill., 2001 
N.D. Ill. District 
Patents:  
contract interpretation 
Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp. 
879 F. Supp. 672 
E.D. Tex., 1995 
E.D. Tex. District 
Patents:  
contract interpretation 
Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Refac 
Technology Development Corp. 
690 F. Supp. 1339 
S.D.N.Y., 1988 
S.D.N.Y. District 
Copyright / software: 
contract interpretation 
SoftMan Products Co., LLC v. Adobe 
Systems, Inc. 
171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 
C.D. Cal., 2001 
C.D. Cal. District 
Patents: antitrust Monsanto Co. v. Trantham 
156 F. Supp. 2d 855 
W.D. Tenn., 2001 
W.D. Tenn. District 
Patents: antitrust Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp. 
88 F. Supp. 2d 1288 
N.D. Ala., 2000 
N.D. Ala. District 
Patents: antitrust Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corp. 
902 F. Supp. 741 
E.D. Mich., 1995 
E.D. Mich. District 
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Patents: antitrust Verson Corp. v. Verson Intern. Group 
PLC 
899 F. Supp. 358 
N.D. Ill., 1995 
N.D. Ill. District 
Patents: standing EyeTicket Corp. v. Unisys Corp. 
155 F. Supp. 2d 527 
E.D. Va., 2001 
E.D. Va. District 
Patents: standing Syndia Corp. v. Lemelson Medical 
Education and Research Foundation, 
165 F. Supp. 2d 728 
N.D. Ill., 2001 
N.D. Ill. District 
Patent: misuse Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai 
Electronics Industries, Co. Ltd. 
49 F. Supp. 2d 893 
E.D. Tex., 1999 
E.D. Tex. District 
Patent: 
shop right as a license 
Marley Co. v. FE Petro, Inc. 
38 F. Supp. 2d 1070 
S.D. Iowa, 1998 
S.D. Iowa District 
General: license as a 
transfer of the 
attorney-client 
privilege 
Ramada Franchise System v. Hotel of 
Gainesville Associates 
988 F. Supp. 1460 
N.D. Ga., 1997 
N.D. Ga. District 
Copyright and 
Patents: obligation to 
license to other users 
Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corp. 
902 F. Supp. 741 
E.D. Mich., 1995 
E.D. Mich. District 
Copyright and 
Patents: obligation to 
license to other users  
Tricom, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corp. 
902 F. Supp. 741 
E.D. Mich., 1995 
E.D. Mich. District 
Trademarks: 
implied licenses 
Department of Parks and Recreation for 
State of California v. 
448 F.3d 1118 
C.A.9 (Cal.), 2006 
C.A.9 (Cal.) Circuit 
Patent: 
jurisdiction for 
licensing matters 
Nutrasweet Co. v. Ajinomoto Co., Inc. 
423 F. Supp. 2d 450 
D. Del., 2006 
D. Del. District 
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Patent: 
jurisdiction for 
licensing matters 
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, 
Inc. 
305 F. Supp. 2d 939 
E.D. Wis., 2004 
E.D. Wis. District 
Patents:  
contract interpretation 
Rowe Intern. Corp. v. Ecast, Inc. 
500 F. Supp. 2d 885, 
N.D. Ill., 2007 
N.D. Ill. District 
Patents: 
contract interpretation 
Dietrich v. Trek Bicycle Corp. 
297 F. Supp. 2d 1122 
W.D. Wis., 2003 
W.D. Wis. District 
Patents: 
contract interpretation 
Epic Systems Corp. v. Allcare Health 
Management System, Inc. 
Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2002 WL 
31051023 
N.D. Tex., 2002 
N.D. Tex., District 
Patents: 
contract interpretation 
In re Hernandez 
285 B.R. 435 
Bkrtcy. D. Ariz., 2002 
Bkrtcy. D. 
Ariz. 
District 
Patents: 
choice of law 
Rowe Intern. Corp. v. Ecast, Inc. 
500 F. Supp. 2d 885, 
N.D. Ill., 2007 
N.D. Ill. District 
Patents: 
choice of law 
Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co. 
490 F. Supp. 2d 756 
E.D. Tex., 2007 
E.D. Tex. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
In re Nu-Corp Intern. Technologies, Inc. 
362 B.R. 308 
Bkrtcy. N.D. Miss., 2007 
Bkrtcy. N.D. 
Miss. 
District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Innovative Engineering Solutions, Inc. v. 
Misonix, Inc. 
458 F. Supp. 2d 1190 
D. Or., 2006 
D. Or. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Canon Inc. v. GCC Intern. Ltd. 
450 F. Supp. 2d 243 
S.D.N.Y., 2006 
S.D.N.Y. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst 
444 F. Supp. 2d 68 
D.D.C., 2006 
D.D.C. District 
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Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Natterman & Cie GmbH v. Bayer Corp. 
428 F. Supp. 2d 253 
E.D. Pa., 2006 
E.D. Pa. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., Inc. v. 
Visteon Corp. 
375 F. Supp. 2d 375 
D. Del., 2005 
D. Del. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Altair Eyewear, 
Inc. 
361 F. Supp. 2d 210 
S.D.N.Y., 2005 
S.D.N.Y. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Melea Limited v. Quality Models Ltd. 
345 F. Supp. 2d 743 
E.D. Mich., 2004 
E.D. Mich. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs 
342 F. Supp. 2d 584 
N.D. Miss., 2004 
N.D. Miss. District 
Patents – Implied 
licenses/exhaustion 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs 
342 F. Supp. 2d 568 
N.D. Miss., 2004 
N.D. Miss. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. 
Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2004 WL 
188078 
S.D.N.Y., 2004 
S.D.N.Y. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v. Ottawa 
Plant Food, Inc. 
283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 
N.D. Iowa, 2003 
N.D. Iowa District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Solutia, Inc. 
256 F. Supp. 2d 433 
M.D. N.C., 2003 
M.D. N.C. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, 
Inc. 
248 F. Supp. 2d 912 
N.D. Cal., 2003 
N.D. Cal. District 
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Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
Trustees of Columbia University in City 
of New York v. Roche 
272 F. Supp. 2d 90 
D. Mass., 2002 
D. Mass. District 
Patents: 
implied licenses / 
exhaustion 
In re The Singer Co., N.V. 
Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2002 WL 
31040349 
S.D.N.Y., 2002 
S.D.N.Y. District 
Patents: 
link between non-
obviousness and 
licensing 
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc. 
460 F. Supp. 2d 659 
D.N.J., 2006 
D.N.J. District 
Patents: 
licensee and standing 
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Altair Eyewear, 
Inc. 
361 F. Supp. 2d 210 
S.D.N.Y., 2005 
S.D.N.Y. District 
Patents: 
licensee and standing 
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, 
Inc. 
305 F. Supp. 2d 939 
E.D. Wis., 2004 
E.D. Wis. District 
Patents: 
licensee and standing 
Logan Farms v. HBH, Inc. DE 
282 F. Supp. 2d 776 
S.D. Ohio, 2003 
S.D. Ohio District 
Patents: 
licensee and standing 
Superbrace, Inc. v. Tidwell 
124 Cal.App.4th 388, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 404 
Cal. App. 4 Dist., 2004 
Cal. App. 4 
Dist. 
State 
Patents: 
licensee and standing 
InternetAd Systems, LLC v. Opodo Ltd. 
481 F. Supp. 2d 596 
N.D. Tex., 2007 
N.D. Tex. District 
Patents: 
license as a defense 
Ciena Corp. v. Corvis Corp. 
334 F. Supp. 2d 610 
D. Del., 2004 
D. Del. District 
Patents: compulsory 
licensing and 
damages calculations 
Monsanto Co. v. David 
448 F. Supp. 2d 1088 
E.D. Mo., 2006 
E.D. Mo. District 
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Copyright / Software: 
right to contract 
(Bowers argument) 
Meridian Project Systems, Inc. v. Hardin 
Const. Co., LLC 
426 F. Supp. 2d 1101 
E.D. Cal., 2006 
E.D. Cal. District 
Copyright / Software: 
right to contract 
(Bowers argument) 
Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive 
Intelligence, Inc. 
425 F. Supp. 2d 756 
N.D. Tex., 2006 
N.D. Tex. District 
Copyright / Software: 
reverse engineering 
Davidson & Associates v. Jung 
422 F.3d 630 
C.A.8 (Mo.), 2005 
C.A.8 (Mo.) Circuit 
Copyright: 
jurisdiction for 
licensing matters 
Ritchie v. Williams 
395 F.3d 283 
C.A.6 (Mich.), 2005 
C.A.6 
(Mich.) 
Circuit 
General: 
contracts of adhesion 
Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. 
Atriums Partners, L.P. 
232 F. Supp. 2d 1257 
D. Kan., 2002 
D. Kan. District 
General:  
standing 
L-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet, 
Inc. 
841 N.Y.S.2d 82  
N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., 2007 
N.Y.A.D. 1 
Dept. 
State 
 
 
